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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is  to trace  the m ilita ry  ca ree r 
in Virginia of Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro* C. S. A. 
The available biographical sketches of T aliaferro  a re  inadequate, 
especially those concerning his .m ilitary career*. There is,die* 
agreem ent over whether or not T aliaferro  was ever prom oted to 
Major*General*. And If he did receive his commission* why was 
it not until the end of the w a rt Was it because he was incompetent? 
If he was competent, then why was hie promotion so long in coming? 
And why was he passed over for promotion when he was the senior 
officer In h is division? What was it that m ade him tran sfe r  to 
another theatre  of war?
Each of these questions posed a problem* T aliaferro  had 
been a leader in the ante-bellum  Virginia politics and society. 
Following the w ar, he again played an influential ro le in Virginia. 
Was it possible that such an Individual would prove incompetent 
as a m ilita ry  leader? Perhaps i R esearch would have to provide 
the answ ers. And it did.
This paper examines Virglnia*6 command resou rces a t the 
outbreak of hostilities in o rder to put in proper perspective the 
professional opportunities a man of T aliaferro1® experience could 
reasonably anticipate. Following this is a  detailed narra tive  of 
Taliaferro*s action during his months of serv ice  in Virginia. The 
conclusion is favorable to T aliaferro . On the whole, he appears 
as a competent field commander. Only an ea rlie r  conflict with 
his commanding general caused T aliaferro  to be passed over for 
promotion in January, 1863. His promotion finally comes, but it 
is  in the closing hours of the war.
The conclusion is that Taliaferro , although not brilliant, 
was as able a  commander as m ost of those who held the rank of 
m ajor general.
v i
THE MILITARY CAREER OF WILLIAM BOOTH TALIAFERRO 
APRIL 1861.- FEBRUARY 1863
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF CONFEDERATE COMMAND RESOURCES
I *. . 1
When Virginia seceded from  the Union A pril 17, 186 l»i she 
possessed a substantial volunteer m ilitary  organization* Her ”paper
i - , * _
re se rv e1* totaled 143, 155 men, the la rg e s t re se rv e  In the South and 
the seventh la rg est in the old Union, But thousands that w ere counted 
as effectives', w ere unfit'fo r‘military'Service'* V irginia1 s arm ed units
, i
totaled 12, 150 men with 118 infantry companies, forty-two companies 
of riflem en, sixty-seven troops of cavalry and twelve companies of 
a r tille ry . Ready volunteers without weapons, about half as  numerous 
as those arm ed, including twelve additional a r tille ry  units which
i l '
awaited needed ordnance, brought Virginia*® total fighting force near 
20, 000 at her se c e ss io n .1
With am ple manpower, the state leg isla tu re  turned to the 
question of potential leaders. Where w ere the brigade, divisional, 
and arm y com m anders to come from ? How w ere competent field 
officers to be provided?
* Douglas Southall Freem an, Tee*® Jbleutenants (Hew York, 1942)J
I, 701-725. F reem an has done the only survey on the Southern Resources
of Command.
2There w ere seventy-five officers on the ro s te r  of the regular 
United States arm y; nineteen w ere colonels, nineteen lieutenant 
colonels, and th irty-seven m ajors. The regular arm y staff was 
compose# of ten colonels, ten lieutenant colonels an# fifty-one 
m ajor s--m aking a gran# total of 146, officers plus the four generals.
The average a g e ,of the generals was sixty-eight, of the colonels 
sixty-seven. Despite the static  condition of the regular arm y1* 
officers, it was assum ed by the ..Virginians that their - sons w ere- 
younger, m ore able, and vastly superior to their counterparts in 
the Herth and that they would go with their state.
Winfield Scott, commander of the Army, was a Virginian, 
as was Joseph E. Johnston, Q uarterm aster General, with the staff 
rank of brigadier general. Six colonels of the line w ere Virginians:
John Garland, Thomas T* Fauntleroy, Matthew M* Payne, Philip 
S ^ ^ e o r g e  ■ Cooke, Washington Seawell, and E o b ertE . Dee* Only 
Cooke and Lee w ere graduates of the Daited States M ilitary Academy. 
Two lieutenant colonels, both West Pointers, w ere Virginians: John 
Bankhead M agruder -and George E.- Lay. Other V irginians holding 
com m issions in the regular arm y w ere: ten m ajors, staff and line, 
seven of whom w ere West Point graduates, tw enty-three captains, 
twenty being West Pointers; of th irty-one lieutenants, tw enty-three 
w ere West .point graduates; and of the ten second lieutenants, all but 
two had graduated from the M ilitary Academy. In all, there w ere
eighty-four regular officers from Virginia, sixty*four of whom had 
gone to West Point*
Virginians second source- of leadership  m ateria l was the’ 
■graduates of West Point who'.-had served in the reg u la r  Army and had 
resigned their com m issions T rio r to- V irginia’s * sec ession;' In 'all," 
there  w ere twenty-two such men who w ere natives of Virginia; '■ '■Some 
of the m ore prom inent men in this Category included Thomas B. 
Randolph, age sixty-nine, residing In M issouri in 186 l t and Walter 
Gwyim, an experienced engineer; specializing in ra ilro ad  and bridge 
construction. Others who deserve attention w ere the Reverend W. N. 
Pendleton, •William" B, M agruder, head  of a  Kentucky g ir ls ’ -school, 
and P rofessor Thomas j . Jackson who: .had earned S' distinguished 
reco rd  in the Mexican War.
Those officers who- had parfcicipatedin the Mexican' War 
constituted Virginia*$ - th ird  source' of officer; m aterial.-. The number 
of these  veterans, not- already  included, in any other’ category, totaled 
at least ninety-four. A rthur C. Cummings, V irginia M ilitary Institute, 
lawyer, colonel In V irginia1 e m ilitia , - and William B. 'T aliaferro , 
Gloucester planter and lawyer, two m en of distinction, had been 
breveted as m ajors during the Mexican War.
Virginia M ilitary Institute, operating in Lexington since 1839 
under the-direction of its Superintendent F rancis H. Sm ith--a mem her 
of the Governor’s Advisory Council--w as to provide an Invaluable
source of potential leaders . Much of the discipline and a la rge  p art of 
the professional train ing of the United States M ilitary Academy had been 
copied by V. M* 1* In the words of one of its historians# it provided 
Ma libera l education, coupled with a m ilitary  training, in belief that 
its  graduates would prove valuable citizens, all the m ore useful because 
capable of bearing a rm s efficiently In the hour of their country’s need.
In 1861, V. M. t  had 433 living graduates and 645 non-graduate s.
Most of them resided  In Virginia and constituted an im mediate and 
indispensable officer re se rv e  corps;
V irginia could also  hope to draw upon the re s t  of the South for 
its  officers. The re s t  of the South possessed  184 living graduates of 
West Point, only eighty m ore than Virginia h erse lf; F urtherm ore, 
th irty -s ix  officers from  other sta tes, who w ere not West Pointers, 
w ere listed  on the Army R eg iste r.- Among the m ore distinguished 
w are B rigadier General D. E. -Twiggs who- had ■surrendered the Texas 
fo rts  to the Confederacy, Colonel A. S. Johnston, a brevet brigadier 
general, and Brigadier General W. S. Harney of Louisiana, who had 
already declared for the Union. Colonel Samuel Cooper, a native 
New Yorker tied to the South through m arriage , was to become 
adjutant and inspector general for the Confederacy. Major Braxton 
Bragg, a breveted lieutenant colonel, Captain P. G. T. Beauregard,
2Ibid., p. 708.
already a brigadier general, for the Confederacy, W. W. Loring#. 
form erly a United States colonel# and. Lieutenant- Colonel W, J. Hardee 
a  recognised, tactician# w ere all to-become fam iliar figures. M ajors 
E arl Van. Dorn and E. Kirby Smith,, who- w ere ;io- have, important, ro les 
in the coming w estern, campaigns#' and lam es. Long s tree t, ..former . 
Army paym aster destined to play. a. leading ro le  with' the Arm y of 
Northern Virginia# a ll (resigned their.(com m issions, to serve the.. 
Confederacy. A few other majors# relatively  unknown# and a con­
siderable number of captains#, old for the ir grade because of the 
sm allness of the United States Army# also- resigned to serve the.
South*..
These, men w ere already busy training rec ru its  in the deep 
South* , V irginia could expect very  few, _ if  any a t all#., to a s s is t in 
organizing her. troops. Neither could, she expect to g e t  officers from 
the existing or defunct m ilita ry  schools in the other Southern .states* 
The Citadel was to- render serv ice to South Carolina sim ilar, to-
V. M. 1. Is  contributions to V irginia. But Virginia, could co-unton 
her, s is te r  -tsta tes for support in battle, when the. invaders-.came...
From  all sources# Virginia could count a maximum of 625 
m en with m ilitary  training or .experience*. . Exclusive- of V. M* I. *s 
contribution, the total was not m ore than 208. The pertinent question 
was., whether they all would support the Confederate cause.
Scott was unyielding,in his allegiance to- the Union*. .Lee,
6although deploring secession* remained firmly for Virginia. Major 
George H. Thomas of Idea's form er regim ent rem ained loyal to the 
Union. Joseph E. Johnston# with staff rank of brigadier general# 
resigned to join the Confederacy. Philip St. George Cooke declared 
his f irs t allegiance was to the Union and not to Virginia* but his 
son-in-law , J . E. B* Stuart, was to tight for the Confederacy.
Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, at the age of sixty-five, sided with the 
Confederacy. Of the other th irteen  field officers* five w ere for 
Virginia! John. Bankhead Magruder* R obert Hall Chilton* Robert S. 
Garnett, Henry H ill and A lbert J. Smith. Hina of the- twenty active 
general and field officers born in Virginia w ere to defend her.
Forty* seven of the sixty-four active company officers appointed to 
the United States Arm y from  Virginia w ere to fight for her. And of 
the seventeen officers who had resigned  p rio r to 1861, th irteen  sided 
with the Confederacy. One active officer and th ree  of those who had 
resigned did not partic ipate on either side.
The response of the Mexican War veterans was a bit d isap­
pointing because of their age. Out of ninety-four potential commanders* 
twenty-five w ere  to enlist In the serv ice  of the South. Some excellent 
officers w ere forthcoming—James JU Kemper* William B. Taliaferro* 
Montgomery D. Corse* and David A. W eislger im m ediately volunteered 
and received com m issions.
The response of the V* M. I. graduates was excellent. Within
three 'm onths of V irginia’s secession, one th ird  of the field officers of 
V irginia’s volunteer regim ents and iw o t birds of the ■'’provisional” 
regim ents Of the sta te  w ere V .' M. I* men. By 1362 they w ere furnishing 
one' third^of 'the regim ental leaders. Eighty *two per cent of'the' 
school’s total 'graduates '(I,. 781 of 1, 902) from 1829 to 1865 w ere to 
serve In the Confederate Army.
Other individuals**sons of V irginia by b irth  And by choice, 
hut‘appointed to the Academy "from other states**w ere to serve 
V irginia. Captain George E. Pickett, h o rn  In Richmond' hut appointed 
to West Point from ’ Illinois, Joined the South. Major Daniel Buggies
of M assachusetts, W est Point Class of' '183-3, was m arried ' to' a
' v . {
Southerner' and chose to fight for the South, B revet Major John C.
PemhSrton of Penasyivania 'reelgned a s  a captain of a rtille ry  in the'
regular arm y because of Southern principles. Major Benjamin Huger,
a brevet colonel in the South Carolina volunteers, Was to  play a  m ajor
ro le  In 'the 'ea rly  Virginia Campaigns.
Despite the numerous resignations' from the regu lar arm y and 
despite th e  high caliber of the leaders she was enlisting, Virginia felt 
humiliated. V irginia had the' highest percentage of officers in the 
United' States' Army which refused to- 'recognise secession. Thirty 
per cent of the West Point graduates from' Virginia- declared  for the"' 
North com pared to a ten per cent average throughout the re s t  of the 
South. Only eighteen of twenty*nine regular com m issioned officers
from  V irginia declared for the South j 'twenty-: seven, of- th irty  *foar 
commissloned'-officers from  the re s t  of the South declared for the 
Confederacy* .'There a re  two reasons for .this relatively^stronger 
pro-Union sentim ent in Virginia* A 'deeper -cleavage over th e is su e  
of secession  existed in Virginia* 1'■■Furthermore* a s o n e  of the Union* s 
oldest and m ost .populous states* she had' continually supplied a la rge  
quota of officers to the.Army*-, many of whom, growing .up within the 
Union as*, a whole, had lost touch, with Virginia herse lf. Most of those 
who retained close tie s  with, her; sided with her* :
On April. 18* 1861, before it was known what m o st'o f  these men 
would do* the Virginia Convention .authorized the Governor to m u tte r  
Into serv ice  as many volunteer -troops at. necessary  to rep e lan y  
Invasion* .and to appoint Virginia*© general,: field* and staff-officers* 
Under V irginia law* .the volunteers elected their company o fficer Si 
the Governor and his council appointed the field officers* ' V irginia 
law differed slightly from -the policy of the Confederate government*
If the volunteers w ere offered'as. battalions or regiments-, they could, 
e lect their' own,field officers' if the ir state law ■permitted. fbretident- 
Jefferson pav is could appoint majors, lieutenant colonels* and 
colonels - only to unattached units*. ■ which;had;been formed .into regim ents; 
otherwise* a ll positions w ere to be filled by elections. The political 
rationale, of this unwise system, was that the  volunteers constituted 
state m ilitia  m u ste red . Into C onfederate, s ervice. _ U nder' the. perm anent
9Constitution, the appointment of m ilitia  officers for battalion, regi*
, m ental, andcom pany commands w a sre se rv e d  to the Individual states*- 
All-comm issions In-the reg u la r arm y o fthe  'Confederacy, w ere by, 
.presidential appointment# although In established,regim ents, all , 
vacancies<beiow .-the-rank of brigadier general w ere  to be “filled, by., 
promotion according to,seniority..**,
The Virginia Convention on the day - that it voted for secession, 
also  authorised the'.Cknrornor.'to.o^ghnise sufficient volunteers to stop 
an enemy---Invasion, and- to appoint the nec es eary field commander s. 
T aliaferro ,’now-a m ajor general of the m ilitia»w as given tem porary 
command of hlor folk* Kenton H arper, another m ajor general in the 
m ilitia , was sent to HarperVs F e rry . Philip St. George Cooke was 
Commissioned brigadier general and ordered  to assum e direction of 
a ffa irs  in  A lexandria. .Major- Daniel Rugglea was assigned- to 
F redericksburg  as b rig ad ie r ,general .of.the- Volunteers. On A pril Z$$ 
Dee, w ith the rank 'of m ajor general#, took command of all Virginia 
forces* 3*: F . . Jbbnstpn# a lso  a  m ajor general of She Volunteers, 
.declined the nommand of the Richmond forces and its defenses for 
the reason  that V irginians-m ilitary organisation was-known to-be. 
temporary* .du t because swift organisation was necessary  for defense 
of the'State#; other officers accepted, the ir com m issions Immediately. 
They were, willing to r isk  losing their sta te com m issions, receiving 
a lower Confederate rank, or having to .serve under a- Confederate
officer whom they outranked'when Virginia* s Volunteer System 'was' 
in tegrated  in to ’the' regular ConfederateA rm y.
Soon regim ents from; other- .states began arriv ing . - Aim.oat 
im m ediately’.f ic tio n  arbS#-between V irginia and Confederate 
authorities, > To alleviate th is  ^ Secretary of War Derby P v  Walker 
|h  form al order's gave Dee# as Virginia commander, tem porary 
control' o f  all Confederate forces w ith in the state* But- even Deb's 
b e e t‘efforts,-could not control’the riv a lrie s  and am bitions of a ll die 
officers. Impatience and bickering seem ed fb dominate a ll con*# 
eider'attons. Then on May 23* 'the-Virginia voters overwhelmingly 
approved the ordinance of secession. Virginia's- troops becam e part 
Of the Confederate m ilita ry  organization.
The Confederacy had fewer than 1500 trained  officers available 
fo r . service*; W est1 Pointers# graduates and non*graduates alike, to taled 
less .'than 300. Graduates and nbm gradoates of the various- state 
m ilita ry  schools totaled approxim ately TOO. V eteran officers of other
3
w ars numbered some 300. But th a t was-all. There-'-were only 1300 
trained, of fleers to  command some ’650,000 volunteers, if  V irginia 
expected to u tilise  her en tire  manpower, which included 250, 000 m ore 
who bad been tu rned  away for lack of a rm s, she would have to- secure
3Robert R. ElliS, "The Confederate Infantry Officer,'' Infantry
Journal. LXIV-LXV <1949), 17.
additional officers* At least 25, 000 general officers of all arm s and 
serv ices would foe needed.
P lan ters, lawyers* bishops, and professional so ld iers a ll 
volunteered tkefr services* The.professionals emphasized the need 
for m ilita ry ■ experience'and,edueationr-the non-professionals..contended 
that the ability to ca rry  a rm s and 'to  command w ere as. readily, the 
gift of gentlem en'as the acquired .knowledge of soldiers* 4 Yet only 
Individuals with m ilita ry  training and experience could evaluate-the- 
com plex-factors of training, ta c tics , -logistics and adm inistration
a
•which, affected'-each of the many commands. ■Altogether,these'-factors 
created  a m ore complex situation in; which the ro le  of staff planning 
becam e m ore,and m ore vital* Both P resident 'Davie and Secretary  of 
War Walker, realized  this. As - f a r : as-possible Infantry brigade and; 
division commands went to West Pointers* F urtherm ore, attem pts 
w erem ad e  to, insure that no-officers-from  sta te-serv ice ' accepted 'rank
Labove the grade of colonel unless the above requ lrem en tsw erem et*
Politicians'fumed* A s 'fa r  as-they w ere concerned: Morth" Carolina 
troops would foe commanded by a Korth Carolina general appointed by
^T. H. and C* G. Dupuy, The Compact History of the Civil War 
(New York* 1962), p. 118*
/ " tivc Confederate Jjhlwifry Off*
6 Ellis p. 17. 1
the North Carolina governor; the Confederate authorities in Richmond 
would just 'have to accept. It. Jefferson Davis, who had his own definite 
Ideas-about-arm y command, was to work in  thls atm osphere of states* 
rights.
A s'w artim e president .of a  ■country''In revolt, Bavis faced many
problem#* The,blockade problem 'w ap 'largely 'the resu lt of Union:
naval superiority* the continual conflicts with the various state
governors w ere the product of states* rights; the problem with his
m ilita ry  com m anders was tdo often the resu lt of personality- clashes.
Frank Vandiver comm eats, that, .fiercely loyal to Ms friends, Dayje
8would never forgive or forget an e n e m y * P e rh a p s  with le ss  m ilita ry  
experience Daviswould have been m ore  charitable' about the short**, 
comings of Inexperienced and- le s s  ab le :subordinates; Rut he could
Q
not brfng him self to tru s t o thers with m ilita ry  trivia* He believed
-himself a competent field com mander, but his strateg ic  .thinking was
often lim ited In scope. After a while he could not see much beyond
10the confines of Richmond and JLee*s departm ent. Above all, he
7Ibid., p. 18.
®Frank Vandiver, Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command
System (Baton Rouge, 1956), p. 28.
9Ibld., p.' 25.
10lb id .. pp. 25-26.
’ ' 11would to le ra te  no m ediocrity In the Army of Northern Virginia.
Davis b'elleved him self a m em ber of the m ilitary  profession#
and supported the professionals* d esire  for a well organised#
professional fighting m achine. Perhaps the professionals w ere too
critical# as some of the civilians*»John B. Cordon# Nathan Bedford
Forrest# Joseph Kershaw# William Mahone*-proved to be fine 
12officers* But Davis was ready to fight the state governors# who 
supported political appointees# on this point.
Despite the continual conflicts and quarrels* by la te  May it 
appeared that the  Confederacy had sufficient men and com manders 
available and enough m ateria l reso u rces (for a short war at least) 
to assu re  victory. The only concern was making certa in  the men 
and war m ateria l w ere at the right places 'a t the right tim es. The 
efforts of the adm inistration took place in an atm osphere of confidence 
and certain ty*-certainty  that once General P. G. T. Beauregard*s 
grand plan had brought the Yankees to battle, the war would soon be 
over.'
Although the adm inistration in Richmond was painfully aware 
of the lim ited number of qualified leaders for any long struggle# they 
w ere confident in the ability of those available to perform  the initial
u Jb id ., p. 31.
* 0  11 7~fvi' (ubr\'fede{rc(fi, kvvfry  O f f i c e r
l2 Ellis#Ap. 18. r r
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tasks efficiently. Southerners w ere confident that they w ere a race
13'born to lead# superior to their b ro thers in the North. As a result# 
they took few pains to tra in  the junior Infantry officers and the non­
commissioned officers* This was to prove a fatal weakness of the
14 ;Confederate a rm ies '." The C on fed era te  a d m in is tr a tio n  and the
South in general expected those men# qualified except for experience
to develop their potential qualities in battle. The school of battle,
however, simply did not graduate enough suitable officers to match 
ISthe casualties. All too of ten, men with high reputations and 
personal followings proved disappointing in the heat of battle. Boastful 
m en who covered up failures, those ambitious for success for personal 
gain, physical cowards, and blunderers with a love for battle often 
em erged instead of another Richard Stoddert Ewell# Thomas J*
Jackson# Richard H. Anderson# or Robert E. Lee.
Lee personified the qualities of command: A sense of duty, a 
sense of honesty and justice# m oral and physical courage, a sense 
of humor, and a'high m oral characte r* -all strengthened'through
n ibid.
I4Ib id .
I 5X bid ., p. 19.
IS
i fsuperior professional ability. Perhaps many of the Southern leaders 
did possess a ll'o f these qualities except the professional ability; p e r­
haps with a m ilitary  education gained'through actual'experience* these 
men  wpuld provide the necessary  officer rese rve . William Booth 
T aliaferro  was one of the Southern leaders who lacked professional 
m ilitary  training. He, too, would need battle experience to develop 
into a qualified officer.
T aliaferro  exemplified the "typical” Southern gentleman of 
the ante helium period. ^  Bern in 1822 of w ell-to-do Tidewater 
parents, he graduated from William and Mary in 1842 and then 
attended H arvard Law School. At the outbreak of the Mexican War 
he organized a company of rec ru its  from Gloucester County and left 
for Vera Cruz. Taliaferro was enchanted with his experiences and 
rom anticized them in his d iary  and le tte rs . Despite youth and its
*7The O ff ic e rG u id e  (H arrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1943), p. 515.
^B iographical sketches of Taliaferro; C. A. Evans, e d ., 
Confederate M ilitary History (Atlanta, 1899), 111, 670. E zra J* W arner, 
Generals In Gray; Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge, 
1959), pp. 297-298. Alien Johnson, ed ., Dictionary of A m erican Biography 
(New York, 1928), XV&I, 283-284.
^ D ia ry  of William B. Taliaferro, U. S. A ., G loucester, Virginia, 
1847, "On Voyage with Troops to Mexican War” and le tte rs  from William 
B. T aliaferro--M exican War, 1847-1848, William Booth Taliaferro  
Papers, College of William and Mary L ibrary , W illiamsburg, Virginia.
All T aliaferro  Papers a re  from the m anuscript collection at the College 
of William and Mary, unless otherw ise noted.
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sentim ents, he perform ed hid duties well and returned home with the 
rank of brevet major* In the ensuing years he continued his law 
practice and engaged in politics, representing his county in the 
Virginia House of Delegates*
His next taste  of m ilita ry  life came In 1859 when the governor 
ordered him to Charlestown, Virginia, following John Brown*e raid  
on Harper*s Ferry .- Taliaferro, now a m ajor general-of the m ilitia, 
took advantage of the incident to revam p the s ta te 's  volunteer m ilitia 
system  and d rill the troops In preparation for g rea te r events. He 
sensed that arm ed conflict had become Inevitable, and in his m em oirs 
sta tes that he
had been active before the w ar in preparation for the event which 
I had expected, and had endeavored to excite a m ilita ry  sp irit in 
the people, and seised hold of the absurd and visionary but cruel 
attempt of John Brown at H arp er 's  F e rry  as an opportunity to 
organize our volunteer system . I was placed In command of the 
troops sent by the Governor of Virginia, Governor Wise, to 
Charlestown to prevent a rescue and made the m ost of my 
opportunity***! never suffered anything so silly  as a  rescue or 
an attem pt to libera te  that fanatic* but I organized, drilled  and 
instructed the troops amounting from tim e to tim e to some 
thousands which w ere placed under my command, and prepared 
them to some extent for the great dram a in which they w ere so 
soon to act. ^
After the election of Lincoln, T aliaferro  becam e an open 
advocate of secession*.
T aliaferro 's  m anuscript recollections of the war, through 
1861 only, T aliaferro  P apers.
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I w as an ardent advocate lor secession. 1 was a firm 'believer 
In the Institution ol slavery. 1 thought It was of divine origin and 
enjoined upon us for the m utual benefit of the white'and negro races.
I honestly believed to oppose the institution of slavery was Infidelity 
to the C hristian  religion. I saw the bright side of the Institution* 
the bright side for the slaves and the bright side for their m asters .
I  lived In a society refined and elevated by its  influences among 
slaves whom I believed to be happy and contented, and I thought 
it a c rim e to destroy; a crim e to lim it and not to extend a 
political and social condition which produced so much happiness 
to both races  and so much independence of character and refine­
ment and v irtue to the dominant race. I believed the rights of 
the-people of the Southern States under’the Constitution'were 
invaded and violated by the efforts of Northern politicians to 
c ircum scribe the a rea  of slavery--and  that the South could better 
protect herse lf under an Independent government and push the 
institution into Mexico or beyond. 2i
Deeply devoted to the cause of the Confederacy, T aliaferro  
possessed  the other necessary  qualifications to help lead the Confederacy. 
He was typical of the non-professional men on whom-"the Confederacy 
had to rely  to fill its positions of command. His personal background— 
Gloucester planter, lawyer* and ‘politician—and his m ilita ry  experience 
as brevet m ajor in the Mexican War and ranking M ajor-G eneral of the 
s ta te  m ilitia , recommended him highly as a person of ability. The 
South expected of Taliaferro  what she expected of others: that actual 
m ilita ry  experience would fully develop his capabilities.
2ilbid.
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Major General William B« Taliaferro was the highest ranking
officer of the Virginia m ilitia during that tense month o£ April* 1861#
(
while his state pondered secession*- ' On A pril 18, 1861, 'when Virginia
■seceded, ’’Taliaferro  was ordered  to 'Norfolk to organise’ and assum e
command of the forces which w ere to be concentrated a t that point.
When the Virginia convention adopted the volunteer system# he applied
for S’commission. On May 3, he w as appointed to .the rank-of Colonel
of Volunteers in the P rovisional Army-of Virginia# and d irected to
take over the post and troops at Gloucester Point# opposite Yorktown,
and protect the York River passage.
Taliaferro'accepted# on May 6, 1861, his com m ission "as'
colonel of'the ''G loucester m ilitia . ’ Eee instructed him to push
2
forward the battery on Gloucester Point a© far as possible.
1 Robert N. 'Scott (ed. under direction of S ecretary  of War), The 
War of the Rebellion: A -001001101100 o f the Official, Records of the Union 
and Confederate A rm ies (Washington, lS80*l’W o|JSerles I, ll7^800,www~  
(Hereafter re fe rred  to as Official Records. Unless otherw ise noted all 
Official Records notations a re 'fro m  Series I. )
2Ibid., p. 831.
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wTaliaferro complied with the o rders, and with the help of John Page of
the Navy, installed two nine-inch gun© at the w ater battery. By May 11#
he had 185 infantry and ninety a r ti l le r is ts  under h ie  command. Two'
m ore nine-inch guns h a ttju s t arrived , and they, too*' w ere scheduled
: $for rapid  installation. ' T aliaferro, having m ad eth e  necessary  pro*' 
lim lnary 'arrangem ents, began establishing Ms posltionon  a m ore 
perm anent basis by May 14. lie requested the n ecessary  authority 
to secure, houses; for needed hospital facilities and offic e r .quarter a *■
Jbee, who disliked the idea of subjecting private houses to m ilitary  
needs, refused T aliaferro 's  f irs t request. In addition, Taliaferro 
requested additional troops, perhaps from the m ilitia  of neighboring 
King and lueen County. This request was approved, and T aliaferro  
was a lso  given the use of the troops from neighboring Mathews 
County*
There was little  excitement o r  action du ring .T aliaferro 's  
tenure in May. He continued to secure his.position on the York River 
but w as unable to obtain sufficient .forces-and equlpm entto construct 
any suitable r e a r  - defenses. The. Only Incident occurred  on May 14:
^ I b id ., p. 834*
4Ibid., pp. 843-844.
5 ib id .. p. 857.
6Ibid., p. 859.
when a Federal gunboat appeared at the month of the riv er. But the 
Federal a were m erely, sounding ''the m outh of the channel and mad# no 
attem pt to force their way up the river.
‘ gHe was. replaced at the end of May'and ordered toRiehm ond. 
There he assumed command of the Twenty* Third Virginia Infantry, 
and on Tune 7 left for .the-campaign In w estern Virginia. : T aliaferro  
and hie regim ent took the ra ilroad  to Staunton and then m arched 
120 m iles to Brigadier General Robert $>■ Garnett*s camp at L aurel 
Hill* ^ The‘campaign-was intended to: prevent the Federal# under 
Major G eneral George B. McClellan*# d irec tion  from securing the 
exposed link of the Baltim ore and Ohio Railroad between Washington 
and P arkersburg . The Federals ■ could not bind together the F ast and 
Midwest, unless they could freely operate th is ra ilroad  without th rea ts 
of ra id s, -r It was the duty of the Confederate force under Garnett to 
prevent the enemy from penetrating to Beverly, the junction of the 
Staunton-Parkersburg stage road and the turnpike to Grafton. 10 By 
holding; Beverly, the Confederates would be able to continually h arass
7Ibld.. p. 844.
8Xbtd., p. 876.
^Letter to Lt. Garnett Andrews from William B. Taliaferro,
G reenbrier R iver, August 29, 1861# T aliaferro  Papers*
^ F re e m a n , Lee* a Lieutenants, 1, 23*24.
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51 k&
G enera l  sk e tch  of r eg io n  of R ich  Mountain Campaign,  July,  1861. 
(Sources: Off ic ial  R e c o r d s  II, 274. L e e ’s L ieutenants ,  I, 26 . )
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the B altim ore and Ohio Railroad*,
T aliaferro ’s regim ent was with the force which formed the 
advance guard at Buckhannon Gap som e eight m iles w est of Beverly.
On July 7 pickets reported a la rg e  force of the enemy under the 
d irection of McClellan* advancing toward the ir position. It was 
M a|or G eneral W. S. Rosecrans, McClellands ab lest subordinate, 
with about 8,000 men# Garnett ordered Colonel Jam es N, Ramsay1 s  
F irs t  Georgia Infantry to hold the enemy. The Confederates m et 
them on the wooded hill to the right of the camp and drove them back, 
L ater that day T aliaferro’s Twenty ♦Third Virginia Regiment relieved 
the Georgia troops a t the ir position on the hill. T aliaferro  successfully 
held the position until nightfall with m inor casualties* -one killed and 
two wounded, **
That night his regim ent was relieved by Colonel Samuel V. 
Fulkerson’s Thirty-Seventh Virginia who held until the next morning. 
Then, In the morning# the F irs t  Georgia relieved the Thirty«Seventh. 
About two o’clock that afternoon* July 8, the Thirty-Seventh relieved 
the F irs t  Georgia with Instructions to hold until nightfall when 
the Twenty-Third would relieve them. As T aliaferro’s m en 
approached the hill# a  party of the enemy made a dash for their
* ^Memoranda of events connected with General G arnett’s
command from ?th to 9th of July inclusive (n. d . }. (H ereafter 
re fe rre d  to as July 1861 Memoranda, T aliaferro  P apers. )
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position. ■ The re su it  was m ass confusion,- F art of the Thirty-Seventh
had already begun re tirin g  as some pf the Twenty-Third began marching
up*. There w as.general, unorganised .firing from  a l l ;sides downhill
toward th e . enemy. Scattered - as - It was#- the firin g .repelled  the .attack
with considerable loss to the enemy. ^
)¥hen Garnett learned, of the situation he sent Colonel William £«
Starke forward to  try  to rectify  the. position, of the. troops* After a _
general consultation. Starke ordered that the hill be abandoned. With
only 4, 000 men, Garnett realized  he,could not hold fhe num erically
superior forces, of the 'enemy, for, any length of time*, T a lia ferro ’s
Twenty-Third withdrew* and by 10:3b that night was posted on another
i ihill some 300 to 400 yards to the re a r . Throughout the night the 
enemy continued to shell the abandoned hill. The next morning the 
Federate continued shelling toward,the camp* but,w ith,little,success* 
T aliaferro  was able to hold his new position for the next th ree days 
with the loss of but one man. ^
pncthe .evening of July 11* Garnett sent for the colonels'Com­
manding regim ents. They w ere informed that the FedeyaJt had
i  . 'J ‘




andhad  se ized  the road 'and the gap. The F ederals w ere squarely
acro ss the Confederate line of re trea t,; forcing G arnett’s m en to go
over the c res t of the mountain and attem pt to reach  Beverly. The
colonels-were'Instructed- to pack the baggage'of'their'1 commands'-with
the utmost quiet and without dem oralization. T aliaferro  said nothing
of a ret|?eat,: but'told his m en they  w ere going to make-a; detour to
’ 16 ■catch a  -’’party iof Yankees11 near SL George.
The heavy rain  that had begun to fall made m arching conditions
m ost difficult. 1 It prevented the m eat from being cookedand the
men survived on bread for the next two days. F urtherm ore the rain
drenched ail' the’tents-and-caused-the eyar-tead'ed- wagons tobog down
quite frequently# The tra in  was a long tim e in starting because of the
rain  and mud. " When the-m arch'finally d id 'get under -way, the F ir s t
Georgia Infantry Regiment of Colonel Ramsay was In front, followed
by T aliaferro’s Twenty-Third Virginia, the wagon train , Colonel H. R.
Jackson’s Thirty-Fourth Virginia, the battery, with Fulkerson’s
ITThirty-Seventh bringing up the rea r .
About sunrise on July 12, after having successfully and 
uneventfully crossed  the mountain, the entire command was within
^ F re em a n , Lee’s Lieutenants, 1, 39-31,
^ J u ly  1861 Memoranda, T a lia fe rro  Papers.
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four m iles of Beverly* The command h a lte d  and after a few minutes* 
re s t  each regim ent turned to the rear# reversing  the o rd er 'o f m arch.
The entire command then took the right hand road at Leedville and 
marched' forward on that turnpike'-toward 'St* George. ^NaUr- 'Beedville, 
Bieutenant Colonel George W. Hansborough’s battalion and one company
. « . 13 , ... j ,
of cavalry joined the command. ■ : It was Garnett*© intention .£o: m arch  
through the Cheat Mountain© towards Hardy County and make hie way 
to B rigadier General Edward Johnson*© command* After having gone 
several m iles on the road, the column halted about eleven o* clock. A 
battalion of infantry with a company of cavalry was posted at this 
point* ^  After resting , the column moved on to Hew In terest where 
it turned off to the right-on an exceedingly had country road going 
d irectly  toward Cheat Mountain*! The ensuing m ar eh'was'-quite tedious*
At sunset the F irs t  Georgia continued forw ard while T aliaferro’s 
Twenty* Third V irginia with the battery rem ained In the re a r .
Several hours la te r  the command came for them to advance.
T aliaferro ,re la tes  "they led,us-'to believe-the. wagons had-succeeded 
in crossing the mountains. But such was not the ease. And
• ^ B e tte r  -to. B rigad ier General H.- R*: Jackson from William B. 
T aliaferro, Monterey, July 25, 1361* Memoranda of events connected 
with General G arnett’s re tre a t, T aliaferro  P apers. ”
July 1861 Memoranda; T aliaferro  Papers.
20Ib w .
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the difficulties that had faced the w agontrain  m ultiplied as  they, struggled 
to get the a rtille ry  over the mountains In pitch darkness# ' ■rain,., and- 
ankle*desp mud* - Only th ro u g h 'th e’*extraordinary exertion** of several 
of his officers#; says. Taliaferro# w e re ; they able to accom plish this.
i ’ *11 * !* • :
difficult task,
-By sunrise  the m orning of Ju ly  13#: the 'Twenty** Third had,
advanced to, within a m ile of the wagon tra in s . • GarnettVs whole
com m andw as once again put Into motion, observing the marching
order of the preceding day* This meant, that Tails ferrous;. Twenty*..
Third Virginia regim ent and Ramsay*# F irs t  Georgia regim ent would
22.again be the .rea r guard* The command proceeded down the steep
side of -Cheat: Mountain and crossed  Shaver's (Main) Fork,of- the Cheat 
R iver ■ at E a te r1 s Ford. On th e ; opposite side of the river* ..the road 
turned left and followed the riv e r bank* A meadow ran  along between 
the'-r|ver and the road to w here the. road again crossed  the riv e r a t 
G arrick1 s Ford.. ^
Garnett continued his re tre a t over the muddy road., Nothing 
■ but ford after ford lay'ahead* And w orse news: before a wagon, had
2 ^Letter, to. B rigadier .General H. R* Jackson from' William B* 
Taliaferro , Monterey# August 10, 1861* Report of Battle of G arrick’s 
Ford# July 13* 1861# T aliaferro Papers*
^July 1861 -Memoranda# Taliaferro Papers,
^ F r ee m a n , .B ee’s  Lieutenants, I, 34*
crossed 'K aler*e Ford, c a v a lry s  coots reported the enemy - closing- in
on the rear of the ■column. •' -Garnett’s adjutant selected a system.
of retiring" upon eligible defensive .positions, Ram say’s F irs t'G eo rg ia
was :‘to form, a c ro ss  the-meadow, and'hold the' enemy until the wagon'
tr a in ;had crossed  the r iv e r ;  then it was to  re t ir e  behind T aliaferro’s
Twenty- Third Virginia. Then Ram say’s regim ent was to., form  a line
behind Taliaferro*# so that the la tte r could re t ire  behind It and reform
behind the Georgians. This system  of holding position after position
for over three m iles to Car rick ’s Ford enabled the wagon tra in s to
escape without any serious attack on the forces and without lo ss  of
men or wagons* At' G arrick’s Ford the crossing was difficult
because of the-swiftness and'depth of the r iv e r and'the.num erous
, ■ ,  •*»£
stalled wagons, causing several wagons to be abandoned,
T aliaferro was ordered to occupy the high bank on the right 
of the ford with-his regim ent and a section of artillery ., • At f irs t 
the uniform s of the Federals appeared identical to those of the 
confederates, and the approaching columns w ere m istaken for
^ R e p o rt of Battle of Car r ick ’s : Ford, July 13, 1861, 
T aliaferro  Papers.
2Slbid.
2% uly 1861 Memoranda, T aliaferro  Papers*
^ R e p o rt of Battle of G arrick’s Ford,, July 13, 1861, 
T aliaferro  Papers.
Ram say’s ■ Georgians.- The mistake-W as soon discovered# and
T aliaferro ’S'men* 'alt-except-Company'A whose strength’had been
. . .  28depleted by sickness 'and .fatigue#4 opened- up. with a fierce barrage. - •
■Together - with the. a r ti l le ry 1'# destructive 'fire* T aliaferro’s Infantry
was able to keep the Federal s. from cross ing the r  iver. •. Finally
when-nearly every cartridge had'been expended* T aliaferro  ordered
the regim ent to re tire .
-Although there w ere thirty ' dead and:wounded#; the men
re tire d  down the hill in perfect o rder. . After inarching alm ost-half
a m ile, the Twenty-Third approached another ford. Here they m et
Colonel Starke who d irected  them to move on and overtake the main
body of-Garnett’s  fo rce . On -crossing*the ford# T aliaferro  m et ’
Garnett who instructed T aliaferro  to detail ten good riflem en to act
30as sk irm ish e rs ,behind some .fallen tree s . Taliaferro -sent an 
entire company* but since there was not adequate protection* all 
but ten were ordered back. He posted three m ore companies on the 
high bluff overlooking the rlv e f, bub discovering the undergrowth to 
be too thick, they soon came back to the regim ent. Starke* acting
^ J u iy  1861 Memoranda, Taliaferro  Papers.-
^ R e p o rt of Battle of G arrick’s Ford, July 13* 1861# 
Taliaferro" Papers. ■
3 0 Ib id .
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underG arn e tt1 e orders*' told T aliaferro1© men to m arch off-and'over*
take the main body. ^  *
As this part of h i$ 'reg im ent m arched'off to the founds of.,
skirmishing to their; rear# Taliaferro ;r eceived 'the;nows that Garnett
had been killed*, .The entire ‘regim ent now;pushed on as rapidly; as
possible for another 'two m ites, cros'sed Parson’s Ford,, and ,©hort|y.
overtook the'm ain body of troops.- ; The other commands w ere
drawn up in good order and anxious., to' r e s is t  the enemy. ^
However» the question of command had to' be' settled firs t.
Colohel Ramsay of the F irs t  Georgia was the ranking officer, but
he had gone ahead with Ms regiment* A  m essenger was sent to
overtake him ; the question was what to do In the meantime. General
G arnett1© aides.suggested their present position was adequate to
make a stand. T aliaferro  objected. For one thing#, the enemy
artille ry  had taken its toll on his reg im e n ts  morale* Furtherm ore,
the ar tille ry  had gone ahead and/T aliaferro  advis ed against making a
stand without it. He was certain  there w ere'defensible positions ahead
34and suggested the a r tille ry  halt and the .infantry fall back. '
3itbld.
33July 1861 Memoranda, T aliaferro  Papers. 
34lbld.
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His suggestion was ■ followed an d th e com m ands' began ■ to m o v e  - 
forward. Taliaferro ■ reform ed ’ f be ■ Twenty* Third*-which w as ■ In ■• 
d iso rd e r ' after the'long re tre a t—on th e■ m arch. Having no orders 
from:' Cblonei Ramsay,- they continued to m a re h , resting: a t  periodic 
in tervals. P resently  the; m essen g er returned*- He h a d in s tr  actions 
from  Colonel' Ramsay which again'pot T aliaferro  In command o f  the 
re a r . It was T aliaferro1© duty to continue to defend the tra in  and to 
chech the Federal e a t every eligible position. To th is o rder T aliaferro  
rem arked, "does Colonel Ram say wish to throw the whole responsibility 
of the re tre a t on m e t If so I  would lik e  to have m ore force In the 
re a r  which Is to be attacked and is in g reat danger.v’^5 The m essenger 
however sta ted that there appeared to be g rea te r danger In front and 
therefo re  the la rgest force was required  there.
T aliaferro  made do with what he had* he placed Jackson*©
Thirty*Fourth In the lead, then Hansborough*© battalion, then the 
Twenty*Third, with Fulkerson*s Thirty-Seventh In the re a r . His 
request for a company of cavalry to blockade the road In the re a r  
was never g ran ted .; The troops continued up Horseshoe- Run, m arching 
without a halt through the gathering dusk* The re a r  was "g reatly  
em barrassed15 by the presence of ordnance wagons* Most of the 
ordnance wagons, lightened by dumping e x c e ss  baggage, had managed
35Ibid.
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to keep up with the advance. Three wagons rem ained with the rear*
and It was im possible to move these forward with any speed* as
the team s had broken down. A request was sent to Colonel Ramsay
to  m ove'forw ard m o re  slowly} h is rep ly  was that- the wagons should
36he abandoned II they hindered T aiiaferro , e movements too much.
•After nightfall* T aliaferro1®; m essengers could no longer
'.keep contact with the advance* which'was m iles ahead. The situation
was quite perilous »*lf the enemy should s trik e  the- re a r , the advance
w as too far to  lend support? if  the enemy w ere In front* the re a r
could offer ho'Sid, for the sam e reason. T aliaferro1® c o m m a s
continued.'to m arch  through the night I n  th is hazardous fashion.
Only by the use of lights w ere they able to d iscern  which road the
Byadvance had taken a t the numerous forks.
At daylight on July 14, the forces under T aliaferro  reached
the Red House In M aryland on the;Northwest Turnpike near Altamont.
<
Here 'they finally caught up with th e  advance. A fter halting a  short 
time* the reunited command continued the ir w m t t h m  the turnpike
t
with Taliaferro*# Twenty*Third leading the way. A. la rge  force' of
38Federal® was nearby* but they did not attack the Confederates. ■'
i
Sfelbid. 37Ibtd,
3®Report of Battle of C arrick 'a  Ford. July 13, 1861,
T aliaferro  Papers.
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The com m and then ha lted  o n : th e  n o rth  b ran c h  of the  Po tom ac b e fo re  
■crossing back into V irg in ia . They continued their inarch  on the road 
to' A‘ point called N eville  w here they ■ took' a  branch to. M oonfield. They 
■advanced along th is ' branch 'to  a  point c a lle d  G reenland, a  'U n ion 'se ttle*  
m e n t v e ry  h o s tile  to 'the Southern cause*- About e leven  p . m .  'the 
colum n finally halted .', C olonel R am say , sick, 'turned the com m and 
Over to -Taliaferro. ^
Ignorant of the- area , T aliaferro  quickly reconnoitered. '; He 
discovered that th e  ro a d  ran  through1 the mountains for "miles and wan 
■commanded by'high ground on both- -sides. Ib is  m eant the enemy 
could endanger the en tire  command If It wer e already 'in  front of 
Tallaferro^s ■forces.' Furtherm or e, his troops w ere only' thirteen- 
m iles from -the Baltim ore and Ohio Railroad via-a good'turnpike from 
New Creek."- This •caused. T aliaferro  anxiety, -for he knew the Federals 
occupied this point and', could easily  and quickly Increase  the ir - numbers 
If the occasion  n e c ess ita te d .40
At IMS' tim e T aliaferro  fortunately overtook the cavalry, which 
w as imm ediately ordered  out as pickets* A ll the roads leading to 
the camp w ere picketed' with an ex tra large, force placed on the-'turnpike 
toward New Creek* T aliaferro1 a- next.' endeavor - was to ’p rocure  needed
3^July i8bt Memoranda, T aliaferro  Papers.
40lbid.
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41food for the commend* ' A fter long# weary m arches the tatter ed and
42exhausted troops finally reached. Monterey*
B rigadier 'G eneral C5arnettls ; death* the hum llltaflon of TOO 
casualties (excluding T aliaferro’s  command) and the abandonment of 
th e ;w estern approaches to the Shenandoah Valley w ere .equally mourned 
by the South.43 Even w o rse  wes the "panle terror", which se ized  
much of theSoufch, The July I f  edition of the. Richmond Examiner 
Insisted, that the effects of the d isa s te r  would he lim ited .and that it 
was the officers .of General G arnett1 s command, that w ere the rea l 
su ffe re rs* -ntheir reputation is  torn, to pieces by the tongue of-rumor. ” 
The Richmond. Qispaieh on .the. sam e day a ttribu ted  the d isa s te r  ” in 
great part to, fa td fy jen e ra ish lp ,i although believing the m ain  reason  
was the .♦’treachery  on the p a rt of. the natives who guided .the m arch 
of the invader*
It was ,in this atm osphere that Taliaferro, w as called upon t o , 
■explain the condition, of hie- command* This unfortunate Incident was 
Sparked by'a le t te r  from C aptain  A ., V*. Scott of T aliaferro ’s brigade 
deploring the disorganised condition of T aliaferro ’s command*.
4 lm d .
.^ F r e e m a n , L e e 's  Lieutenants, I, 36.
43Ib id .. p. 36.,
44Ibid., note, p. 36.
Taliaf o rro  w as. not inform ed of ’th e 1 le tte r  • for a lm ost1 a ; month*' Referring 
to Its'contents#: T aliaferro  agreed that Scott’s contention'about the 
condition of the regim ent w as 'co rrec t hu t denied that the regim ent 
had ever “become completely dlsorgahiaed*,1^ ^  D espite the trying 
c ircum stances’ the regim ent still m aintained discipline. Taliaferro 
attached a note from Scott to his rep o rt saying that Scott had never 
Intended to convey the: Im pression that the regim ent had lost' all 
.semblance ;of discipline* ^
■In .his ■ report# ■Taliaferro then went into a lengthy-' descrip tion
of the'.condition of .the regiment* ■ The aggregate total had been r  educed
fr om 65 9 to 544* by A ugust129, when 'T aliaferro ' wrote.' from- O reenbrler
River#*' w here:his command had been stationed awaiting further orders*
There w ere sixteen deaths, twenty discharges,, one .transfer# ■ sixteen
killed in, action* and a  .total of sixty-two left either sick at'’ la u r e l  Hill#
wounded# .taken p risoner on-the'march#( or missing* Of the 544, 'MZ
w ere p resen t w ith 291- fit'fo r duty*, ‘The. other 222#: nearly  all of whom.
w e re ;slck# had been left a t McDowell and Monterey. Leaves of
absence 'had:' been 'given "to. a  few upon-, certification of the medical
47d irec to r that they would, d ie 'If they "Stayed in the field*' -
4 & L etter to h t. G arnett Andrews from William B. Taliaferro# 
G reenbrier River# August 29# .166.1# T aliaferro  .Hapera*
46lbW. 47Ibid.
He followed up with a lie t of the causes that had o p sra ted to
p ro stra te  h is  regiment* When'the regim ent had left Richmond in
Tune It had been . badly equipped and lacked sufficien t-tents. Upon
1 : ; 
r  eaching Laurel Hill# h is m en  had' been under- severe duty both day
and night#- constantly ; creating a  ^postu re  of defense*n The 'distance ■
■ from , an adequate supply base was great: and foraging par ties war e
necessary ,dally  to 'p rocu re  "food ho rn  the surrounding countryside.
Also con tr ibuting to - thfl-r p rostra ted  condition - was the continual
contact w lth; the Federate* numerous, night, patro ls were, sent Out
to waylay; the-enemy# the guard and picket, d u tie sw ere  severe due
to continual. Federal ...firing* and heavy skirm ishing occurred  day' and
night* ■ Furtherm ore* ;,many of the 'm en  slept in the trenches without
■protection from:the- ra in ,; On top of all. this, a m easles epidemic
had broken out.
- Therefore# by the--.time the o rders to-m arch were; given-on 
Tuiy ,11* - the men w ere .already In poor, condition* That'night and 
all the. next day they  were, on the move with only a few hour s of re s t. 
After Reaching th e  m ain cam p-just outside of Beverly th e re  was. 
a-brief halt and then-the m arch  got underway again w ith - the Twenty* 
Third s till acting-as the re a r  guard# now with the assis tan ce  of the.- 
First-G eorgia; * . Upon c ro ssin g . Cheat Mountain# the column faced 
ford after' ford*, it was the-duty o f the re a r  guard to r e s is t  the enemy 
long' enough.- to: allow the- wagon t r a in  to escape*- Then at Car rick* s
Ford# the Twenty*Tfaird-alone _ engaged' the enemy while 'the r e s t  of the 
troops -were resting* 'They w ere  -then ordered  to overtake th e 'main
: . 1
body* - a  task that called for -a m arch of four miles# the 'cresbfhg of 
another ford 'and engaging the enemy fn the p rocess. The Twenty*- 
Third continued to .guard' the1 rear-' oh the m arch id Red House, And 
m arched 'all rilghi again many .miles Into; Virginia*
;'By the tim e his command had" reached Monterey, the mdn "had 
'finally succumbed to- the m ental and physical sufferings they had 
endured. • 'Taliaferro was confident,' he said# that although h ie ' 
regim ent had seen-the'hardest 'Service of alT in ■ ffcarhett:*s' Army# ■ the 
rem oval'to 'the E ast would produce !fhe'needed# beneficial m o ra l ■ 
effect on his m e n ;^  Aiready# two weeks before he  was asked to 
defend' its  condition#" he had asked' tha t1 he be given independent command
cn
of his regim ent*: • He had been reluctan t to se rv e  d irectly  - under 
Colonel R am sa^f now# A ugust'29# he-asked for a  tra n s fe r* ; His ■ 
transfer w u sto  come#' but no tbefo re  his regim ent had undergone 
another Campaign.
•Oh September 9, B rigadier General H. R. Tacks oniuform ed
4dibld.'
^°Lettor to Brigadier General H. R, 'Jackson from  W illiam B. 
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R e g io n  of Cheat  Mountain Campaign,  S ep tem b er  9 -12 ,  1861.  
(Source: R. E. L ee ,  I, 5 6 3 . )  G r ee n b r ier  Camp of T a l ia f e r r o ' s  
t roop s  in v ic in i t y  of w h e r e  S ta u n t o n -P a r k e r sb u r g  P ike  c r o s s e d  
G r ee n b r ier  R iv e r .
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Taliaferro, that the Twenty** Third and Fulkerson* s Thirty "-Seventh had. 
Seen detailed, to accompany Colonel-Albert Rust’s T hirdA rkansas to 
B rigadier G eneral W. W. Boring’s headquarters, .-They were-to co­
operate with Boring*s command ■ under ^ -Bee'*s • guidance... Bee had■ been 
sent-out from' Richmond.- ■ It w as hoped that hecou ld  recoup the losses 
the Confederates -had■'suffered-in w estern Virginia*-.. The- objective was 
to su rp rise  -and assau lt - the. Federal' position on' Cheat M ountain.'
Colonel Rust: had been assigned to command the- expedition* 'Although 
It was necessary  to waive rank, Taliaferro* knowing little  of the 
te rra in  or enemy positions, declared he would happily en trust him self
e 1
to- Rust’s leadership.
Rust’had personally reconnoitered the a rea .. \He ,had d is­
cover ed that a  column could,make its  way along the w estern  ridges 
of Cheat Mountain to a point two m iles west of its  c re s t and directly  
on the road which supplied the Federal forces;on top of the mountain.
The F edera l« had only som e trenches and a blockhouse at this point 
which could be taken easily. From  this lofty position an assau lt 
could, easily -foe made on. the .Federal flank which was exposed.' By
$ ^ William B. Taliaferro*,'Memorandum- of occurrences and 
a .march of two- forces under Colonel Rust, Third A rkansas, to- 
Cheat Mountain* 9* 10, 11* 12. September# 1861* w ritten  from camp 
a t C t ^ n b r i m  R iver, T aliaferro  Papers. (H ereafter re fe rre d  to 
as Greenbrier- Memorandum, T a lia fe rro ;Papers*!
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th e tim e  T aliaferro  arrived , the offensive plan was worked out.- ■ 
T aliaferro  rem arked that he was concerned -that the enemy w ould.<
have strong entrenchm ents guarding'the- F ederal rear-, hot Was, •
' ’ • • a# ‘
reassu red  by Rust that this was notithe case.. -
. T aliaferrors •regiment awaited' day1break' on -.the ten th  with 
■ the re s t  of the force a t  Havener*s on:the Greenbank Road. ' The .< 
column went. into', the woods at/thApoinl#; ascended uthe backAHeghany, n 
forded the 'G reenbrier’R iver and mounted the f irs t top of Cheat , 
Mountain about'dark, • Dawn of the eleventh came* and ■ the force' began 
its ' descent down th e  mountain along a  creek- which led Into'Ghent River. 
At-the point-Where the- creek in te rsec ted  the river* Rust assem bled 
his field'‘Officers- and explained/the p!an of attack. The column was 
to assau lt the enemy camp through the woods which protected it. To 
get Into position to do so, they would f irs t have to m arch  to the Staunton 
turnpike.. At this point, Hansborough with th is command of 100 ‘men was 
to assau lt the 'sm all F ederal fo rce up the turnpike on the left. T aliaferro  
w as.to take his men* go up th e 'ro ad 'a  sho rt distance.*' tu rn 'rig h t and 
■get between-the woods and the .Federal position* Rust, with his men 
and the rem ainder of Tacksonfs' command* was to -move up-'the- road 
to White* s ' houses Thus*' with sim ultaneous attacks.*. the .forces would
5 2 F r e e m a n , IL JS. L e e , . I, S 6 0 -5 6 2 .
^ G r e e n b r ie r  M em oran d u m . T a lia fe r r o  P a p e r s .
assa il the. F ederal encampment, in the. re a r  and on the left flank, -By 
nightfall the forces w ere ; within a m ile and ,a half of th e  enemy’s-, camp. 
There they halted for the, night. .
Meanwhile the '.other .Confederate;forces, operating under 
Lorlng*a - command, "had carried-out ,■ their- p arts  In. Dee’s p lan .; : 
iam ae l Read Anderson was w here he could reach the , Staunton*, 
P arkersburg  turnpike In a ru sh  in order to prevent any reinforcem ents • 
being dispatched to Cheat Mountain.' Donelson's m en occupied, a 
position w here they ■ could support either Anderson o r Loving, ■ Lor|ng*s 
troops had m arched down- the" valley, close to the enemy* - -if. all. worked 
well the enemy would be driven down Tygart’s Valley; with Anderson’s 
forces poised  to. s tr ik e  andD onelson’s ready to pursue, - victory could 
yet be.achieved-In th is rugged-western'V irginia area . '.‘The-key was 
Rust on the. eastern, side of the mountain. Would he be successful?
Rust’s m en, exhausted, by ,-the rain* cold and rugged te rra in  
of the previous day* w ere ready to move by-two o’clock on the 
m orning . of, the. ten th .. D arkness - and dense underbrush prevented 
them' from; moving until sunrise. Then* leaving behind.their blankets* 
overcoats, and haversacks, they m arched to- the turnpike w here they 
su rp rised  and captured the enemy- picket guard. Examination o f  the
$4th|d,
SSpreeman, R> E* Lee, 1* A&2»$66»
p r iso n e rs ' showed that: Rush*® plan was w orthless. There w ere  F ederal
d e fe n se s  In th e  ■rear, A m u sk e tp ro o f  b lo ck h o u se  a t  th e  bend of th e .'ro ad
and four pieces - of artillery ' clearly  commanded the road*. These w ere
supported by. two- regiments* one on bach side, of th e  road# 'w hich'w ere
protected by log w orks. However,-'there w ere no -works for a  sho rt
space on th e  south side of the encampment,- ^
A new plan was devised. The command would move in two
lines to- the south side. From  that point-they would attem pt an-attack
by penetrating within the enemy encampment. The forces moved back
to the turnpike with their captured wagons and p risoners and began
their attem pt to approach the enemy from the south. Although greatly
ham pered by dense brush the troops pushed to within a short distance
of the F e d e ra ls ,, A party  was sent- forward to reconhoiter. They
reported ..that -any assau lt would h e  sheer m adness as the Federals
STw ere also strongly protected by earthworks at this point. The 
officers dehided* without a dissenting vote, to re tu rn  to camp. They 
did not venture, to m eet Anderson who had penetrated to Staunton Road 
below. .-Instead the troops returned 'over the sam e tra il as far. as 
Cheat E lver, The next morning they resum ed their m arch  back to
C ft
camp* arriv ing early  that after noon*
^ G re e n b r ie r  Memorandum# T aliaferro  Papers.
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In the meanwhile Lee waited for word from Rust. , Nothing In 
the way. of m usket volleys had been'-heard from. Rust who-was--Supposed 
to have opened the offensive On the morning of September 12. By noon 
all -'expectations of the morning had vanished. Lee’ s plan could not 
- be executed.- in 'any essential. . sphere was- still, no -word 'from . Rust -on 
the m orning of September 13. Lee s till hoped, to hold his position In 
Tygart’s Valley, and f |n d  another route to the Federal*s r e a r .  L ater 
in the day he was inform ed of what had happened east of Cheat 
Mountain, It was now apparent that nothing could be accom plished On 
the w est side either and the re s t of the troops w ere also ordered to 
fall back to their original positions, ^
T aliaferro’s men proceeded to camp again at G reenbrier 
River after the abortive attem pt on Cheat Mountain* On October 3, 
a large force of enemy Infantry approached their encampment. 
Dispositions, of the, Confederate'forces w ere imm ediately undertaken, 
Taliaferro  was now acting brigadier ro r the Twenty-Third and F orty - 
Fourth Virginia Infantry and a battalion of the Twenty*F ifth  ..Virginia*. 
He ordered  h is troops to occupy the trenches defending the. front, 
approach. He ordered the a r til le ry  to a position commanding the 
turnpike and meadow to the front and left of the Confederate position* 
The pickets gallantly re s is ted  the oncoming Federals, but slowly
Sketch of B a t t le f ie ld  of G r ee n b r ier  R iver ,  
October 3, 1861. (Source: Off ic ia l  R e c o r d s ,
mretired  against overwhelm ing adds. P a rt of the Federate came off the 
turnpike and began m arching a cro ss  the r iv e r  Hat* the re s t  occupied 
the h ills  to  the eight of the road. 60 A heavy artillery  exchange followed  
Immediately* Most of the F ederal f ire  was concentrated on the m ore 
exposed positions held by T aliaferro. ^ 1
The Intense Confederate b arrage  forced the enemy* to fail back 
■out of range. The Federal# then tried' to tu rn  the Confederate left 
flack. P a r t of their force# advanced to a point opposite the center of 
T aliaferro1# position under f ire  from the Confederate troop# on the 
right. Once In position* they began marching downhill to the meadow 
with the Intention of assaulting T aliaferro1 s works. P repara to ry  to 
the ir assault* they opened fire  on the Confederate# with the ir long* 
range m uskets. But the effective Confederate a rtillery  and coolness 
and gallantry of T aliaferro1# troop# soon threw the Federal# Into 
confusion and re trea t. A fter som e tim e Still under heavy fire, they 
managed to reform , regain the turnpike*' and with the ir batteries 
withdrew. The Confederate lo ss w as quite sm all com pared to the 
heavy lo sses  of the F ederal s . Taliaferro®# command suffered only 
#|m casu a lties, two killed and four wounded. Taliaferro* himself*
fe°Q « |c la l R ecords. V, 231.
6 *ib td .. V, 226.
6 2ib id .. V. 231-232.
was praised  by H. R. Jackson, the commanding general* to r  the cool 
skill and energy displayed under fire . ' -
F o r four, months Taliaferro, had effectively- performed, his 
limited-duties in a  se r ie s  of futile Confederate cam paigns In w estern  
Virginia* Under battle conditions h e  w as proving him self a  capable 
leader*• 'He. felt that his services, m erited, a  transfer' to.; an  a re a  where 
he- could develop his potential more, fully. ' Finally his request for a 
tran sfer was granted* T aliaferro  would, soon -fee- seeing serv ice  - In 
norther n Virginia -'under ■ Thomas J. - Jackson.
CHAPTER m  
AM INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING UNDER JACKSON
\ By December 9, 1861, T aliaferro  had a rriv ed  with'hie-brigade 
at' Thomas J* ■ ,^ fStonewaiT, Jacks o n ^ e a m p  at W inchester, Virginia.
In October, Jackson had been' assigned to com m andthe Shenandoah 
Valley D istric t' In the  Department' of Northern V irginia. -...On'' ' 
November S, Jackson had 'established his headquarters at Winchester 
where he began improving the condition of his scantyforees* B y  
the middle of November he had form ulated a plan for an advance on 
Romney. * For"-this venture he needed .additional troops*. Luring1s 
troops w ere sent to supplement" the forces'o f Jackson* But the 
■command o f these new troops was to ’rem ain se p a ra te ,' under the 
continued direction of Loring, as the Army of the Northwest* ^
Jackson wanted his forces fco move against'the Federal com-* 
m unicatlons along the Potomac. His purpose was to  destroy  the  
Chesapeake.and Ohio Canal by blowing up several dam saround 
Hancock, Maryland, and to d isrupt the 'easlowest Baltim ore and-
* Official Records, V, 389, 913, 937, 96$,. 988-989^
^Freem an, Lee*s Lieutenants, 1, 122-123.
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Ohio Railroad serv ice  by damaging -several'Sections of track .
Taliafer ro 's  br igade was to play an ';teportani ro le  in Jackson® s
1 % - campaign. ' Under cover of several dem onstrations "made against
various F ederal positions along the Potomac east of their objective, 
advanced troops concentrated near Dam" F ive 'on December 17.
'Four days la te r they bad successfully breached i t , ' disrupting' the 
can a l.' !On January I, the  m ain force moved northward from 'W inchester. 
'The'two columns united and. bn January 4, drove the F ederal forces 
from  Bath*' •Jackson®s men proceeded to c ro ss  th e 'Potomac, 'bom­
barded Hancock, 'and then, receiving no support, withdrew 'toward 
Romney oh th e  7 th.
Snow and slee t had been falling for 'severa l days'and' the read# 
w ere next to Im passable for’ the a rtille ry  and Cavalry. Not until 
January 14 did Jackson 's advance guard, Taliaferro 's, b rig ad e ,' reach  
Its destination. The m ain force a rriv ed  a t Romney the nex tday .
i
Fortunately for the men, who w ere 'a lready  beginning to suffer from 
the numerous hardships incurred through two weeks of Continued 
exposure to the h arsh  elem ents of w inter, the Fader alb once again
Taliaferro® s brigade consisted of the Twenty-Third and 
'Thirty-Seventh Virginia,' the Third A rkansas, and the F irs t  Georgia..
^Robert Underwood Johnson and C larence Clough Buel, e d s . , 
Battles and'L ead ers (New to rk , ' 1084-1887), II, Official R ecords,
V, 389.....
offered no resistance.
Jackson could not re  si at the temptation to p u rs u e h ls  enemy.
lie would take Me ’'Stonewall Brigade*1 under G arnett and' T a liaferro 's
brigade and p ress the F ederals back ac ro ss  the Potomac. .If this
could be achieved, he could d isrupt the Federal communications over
a wider a re a  by destroying severa l Baltim ore and Ohio, bridges
5ac ro ss  the Potomac and Pattersou*s. •'Creek* But Taliaferro's-:
brigade w as'dim inished in size and all but dem oralized because of 
fatigue, sickness and casualties. It was in no., condition for. 'active 
operations.
In a  le tte r dated January 20, tod* P. Benjamin, Secretary
of War, Jackson adm itted that a ll of B oring 's brigades-w ere in poor
condition, 'but that.'he was. .confident, their condition would be .greatly
Improved in,a few days* Jackson was confident theyw ouldbe able
to. hold-this-: im portant position, provided the troop© w ere given
b
adequate winter, quarters* Beterm iaed to hold Romney, he'proceeded 
to sta tion-T aliaferro 'and the r e s t  o f  Boring*© command there  and 
returned  Garnett*'© troops, to Winchester* This- arrangem ent was 
made because Jackson believed that ’’G arnett's experienced and fast
5Frank E. Vandiver. Mighty Stonewall {New York, 1957}. 
pp. 188-189.
6 Official R ecords, V, 395, 1039.
m arching regim ents could * * . move m ore quickly than Boring’s, 
troops to  .any'threatened part: of the; d fstrle ti I’7 The logic of this 
assum ption o€ Jackson was strengthened by the fa e tth a t eome of 
Boring’s troops w ere relatively 'Inexperienced;and slow In m arching 
whfch had prevented Jackson from moving as swiftly a s h e  had ;
gdesired  during, the campaign.'^
Regardless, of Jackson’s reasoning,., the m en o fB o rln g ’s com* 
mand w er ©dissatisfied* When Jackson took his ’’Stonewall Brigade** 
back to the com forts of W inchester, they viewed this la s t  move m erely  
as  another ac t of favoritism  shown toward h is  ,rpet lambs* Perhaps 
It was this act that 'finally broke'that proverbial ’’cam el’s b ack .M IBs 
troops had nearly exhausted them selves In the ir struggle against the 
Federals and the unrelenting, harsh  elements, of nature. .Taliaferro 
describes the conditions under which h is  men. existed;.during, the 
campaign*
*., . . .there was neither tent nor camp equipage*, Ho. house was. 
there,', hardly a  tree , th e  w eather w as Intense* and 'a hard*
-crisp snow sheeted the landscape*. It Is a fact that'the enemy 
lite ra lly  snowballed us, for the m issiles  from, their guns scat* 
te red  the-hard snow .and hurled the, fragm ents upon us, alm ost as 
uncom fortable to us a s  the sp lin ters from the ir shells* 0aya 
and nights we w ere without shelter-.of any kind. -One officer
^Freeman# B ee’s  lieu ten a n ts, I,- l&$*
^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, p. 188*
^Better to Holmes Conrad from William B. T aliaferro,


















sent his servant back for bis campbed, and Ike next morning, 
covered with enow, It was an antique tomb, with the effigy' of 
an ancient knight carved upon it. i Fortunately for us, the 
fences of that country w ere  not all of stone and knew how to 
burn. ^
tinder such'Condition# It i s  understandable that, Jackson6 s men and 
officers grew m ore and m ore discontented with the ir se rv ice  under ■ 
him. Jackson him self w as apparently unconscious of -either cold or 
suffering*. His attitude is clearly  revealed In his official report when, 
admitting the tack of tents and other' essentials, he sta tes  that the 
men, except for part of Loring’s command, **kore up under -these 
hardship#.., with the- fortitude becoming patrio tic  so ld iers. **
.Jackson*# officers lacked his zeal. Neither the campaign nor 
the logic behind, it had im pressed  them* To them# the- en tire  .m arch 
had been nothing short of m adness,,, How they w ere  isolated in 
Romney. • ■ They w ere bound, and determ ined to have;their troop© 
removed .from their desolate outpost to the com forts of Winchester.- 
Blsconteot soon m anifested It self In, the form o f 'le tte rs  to  s e v e ra l  
politicians In Richmond complaining of the  conditions prevailing at- 
Romney*
Personal Rem iniscences of-Stonewall Jackson11 by William B. 
T aliaferro, (unpublished m anuscript) T aliaferro  P apers. This is 
T aliaferro 's  -description of the conditions o f th e  m arch-itself,' but' 
things w ere'no better a t their camp at Romney.
11 Official Records, V, $95*396,
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Colonel' Fulkerson of Taliaferro*'#brigade Initiated 'the :-
centreversy 'w ith  his report of the conditions a t Romney. He sent
hi# letter* with Boring’s approval, to-Walter R. Staples*., a prominent.
Virginia politician 'in  the Confederate''Congress* ' who w as d irec ted
12to see that it was delivered to the a d d re sse e ^ P re s id e n t Davis. *■'
Oh. January ‘23* T aliaferro 'a lso  wrote-' to 'Staples* a longtime, friend 
of-the- Taliaferro  family*.' In re feren ce  to Fulkerson’s le tte r. Taliaferro  
observed -that it was tru ly  unfortunate that the strength of the best 
arm y he had ever seen had been destroyed-by **bad m arches and bad 
management*n At th is tim e, - he, a lso  recom m ended .the 'immediate 
withdrawal of'the troops or ” we will not C bave_7 a', m an of this arm y 
for the spring campaign.**^ Two days la te r a petition deploring the 
condition of the arm y at Romney was form ally presented to Boring*
It was signed foy eleven officer© of his command*- Colonel T aliaferro’s 
name headed'the list* The "petition complained of the severe degree 
of Mhardship, toil, exposure, and suffering th a t £  found/? no paralle l 
In the* prosecution of the p resen t war*f undergone by the ir men during 
the previous eight months. By the f irs t of December the troops w ere 
already exhausted*, the rep o rt continues# but instead of camping for 
the w itte r, they w ere ordered id V/inchesier where they subsequently
l 2n>id,, pp. 1040-1041.
I3Ibld., p. 1042.
participated in  the Romney campaign*. ; On this expedition'the m en
laced ''numerous ’’toilsome 'm arches’* and'©pent night, a lte r night L 
without tent a, blankets or even axes to cut wood# in the ’’coldest 
period of a cold clim ate. ” Their p resen t encam pm ent'w as'on’’wet* 
spou ty la  nd" which was' nothing m o re1 than a  sheet ol w ater when It 
rained.' Furtherm ore their location was precariously near the : 
Federal position on the B. & G. Railroad.' T he'report concludes 
that-” *. '> v your arm y 'could he ■maintained much m ore comfortably 
and a t much le ss  expense and 'With-every m ilita ry  advantage at
1 j|
alm ost any other p lace*11
Boring, agreeing th a t 'M s  rep o rt reflected the true-condition 
df his troops*, forwarded the' petition "to Richmond. ’ Desiring that 
the case'fee clearly  presented, he asked Taliaferro* who was just ;" 
going on leave* to take a copy of the petition to  Richmond and 
personally hand If to  the President. .Irregular as the procedure was* 
Taliaferro'com piled* - and worse'yet*- 'President .Davis accepted the copy 
from 'him . Davis proceeded to pull out a map-and had Taliaferro  
explain, the en tire  situation* As- T aliaferro  la te r  recalled* Davis 
sa id 'that Jackson had committed'a: m istake and Immediately ordered 
reconcentration of the forces- at Winchester*  ^ ■
14|bid. , p. 1046.
15Letter to Holmes Conrad from William B. Taliaferro,
July 1 i* 1877, T aliaferro  P apers.
Jackson imm ediately, though reluctantly, ca rrie d  out the order.
He also  wanted to resign  his command And. transfer' hack to. V* M. I. ^
Such a resignation would he detrim ental to the Gonfederat e command
systems therefore, Immediate-action, was delayed as-' Governor Betcher
of Virginia attem pted to persuade Jackson to  reconsider* As Jackson
waited, he attem pted to have Boring sent hack to Romney. When this
failed, Jackson p re fe rred  charges against Boring for neglect of duty
17and conduct subver sive to good m ilitary  discipline.
■ Fortunately cooler - heads prevailed .’ Jackson yielded to the 
argum ent'that his resignation would have a discouraging: effect:on-the 
m orale' of the young Confederacy; His'-letter of ■resignation was 
returned  to him. Boring was tran sfe rred  to another th ea tre  of 
operations, but was not further rebuked* On the contrary,; he was 
prom oted to Major General; furtherm ore, the charges against him 
w ere dropped.
.The favorable treatm ent accorded Boring did- not please ‘
Jackson. • Also' disconcerting w as B oring’s  "request for- the" prom otion
toof T aliaferro  to B rigadier General. Jackson had be eh thoroughly
^ Official Records, V, 1653..
17lb jd ., pp. 1055-1656. * 
l^Freemam, - Bee* s Bleutenant s , ■ I, 129*
^ B e tte r  to ’J. F. Benjamin, ■ Secretary  o f ‘War,-';from: W«. W. 
Boring, Febru& ryl3, 1861, T aliaferro  Papers-.
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disgusted with all of the political maneuvering behind the scenes
during the rounderobin affa ir, fie was net likely to forget that
T aliaferro  had been one of the m ain ag itators in the controversy*
Jackson was to re ta in  b itter m em ories of this affairi his anim osity
toward T aliaferro  would never com pletely subside. He was justified
In his contempt for the m anner In which the affair had been handled*
The procedure itse lf was not In accord  with, m ilitary  discipline and
good order* T aliaferro ’s attitude was the epitom e of the insubordination
characte ris tic  of Jackson’s officers*
That th is was an e ra  in which politicians and other non*
professionals played an important* though often blundering* role
In m ilita ry  a ffa irs  does not a lte r  the fact that such a  condition was
simply poor m ilita ry  discipline and ham pered m ilita ry  efficiency*
Examining the logic of Jackson’s campaign itself* Vandiver
concludes that Jackson’s  reasoning was sound*
He £  JacksonJ7 hoped to attack Bath* to c lear the enemy 
from that vicinity and from Hancock* Maryland*, not far north 
of Bath* to destroy communications between Federal G enera ls .
Banks and Kelley* and to threaten  Kelley’s re a r . Cut off, without 
news of what was happening around him* Kelley might be driven 
to evacuate Romney without fighting, or he might be .goaded into 
fighting alone. If he fought alone, Jackson would outnumber him** 
a tactic which Jackson always sought to employ. 20
Jackson’s hopes had been fulfilled. He had driven the Federal#
2^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall* p. 18$.
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from Romney. From  this position the Confederates could strike  
effectively a t the east-w est communications of the B. & O. Railroad} 
this was something the South had been trying unsuccessfully to 
accom plish through many weary campaigns and. months of failure In 
w estern  Virginia. Only one black m ark  appeared on Jackson1 s 
^records' the condition .of h ie ‘troops* Before the controversy had ever 
begun*. ■ Jackson had admitted, that the ir m o ra le  was low , but expressed 
his confidence that their condition' couM be improved. .Improvement 
m eant adequate wlnter housing; adequate housing' required  the 
se rv ices of a competent engineer# and-a good engineer was simply
2i
not available* ■ =: Despite this. Jackson  stubbornly-refused to 
relinquish h is'gains until o rdered  to do: so. Jackson can be rep ri*  
manded for this obstinacy which b lu rred  his vision to 'the hardships'' 
endured by his -men. Perhaps*' a s  T aliaferro  notes in  his Reminiscences* 
the ends accom plished b y  the Romney campaign do not Justify the 
Sacrifices which w ere made. 22 ■ The conditions -existing within the 
arm y-w ere inexcusable! proper caution, should have been used to 
a ssu re  that these conditions did 'not occur.' But Jackson-cannot be 
severely  c ritic ised  for the logic of 'his campaign itself. The fact
^ Official Records* V, 103$.
22,rPersonal R em iniscences. of 'Stonewall Jackson'* by William 
B. T aliaferro, T aliaferro  Papers.
that the'cam paign took p lace  in the middle of w inter m erely em phasizes 
Jackson* s ability to-"achieve su rp rise  by using the unexpected.
•The Im portant th ing ' w as-that■ Jackson rem ained. He was 
soon busy molding h is fo rce  Into-a tr im  fighting unit. --Mot that he 
forgot the 'incident entirely . It- was Just th a t■ -there weire m ore pressing 
problems-. The FederalS  had planned. afchree-prOnged th rust towards 
Richmond for - the sum m er of 1862. McClellan would bring  100, 000 
F e d e ra ls to  the Henlnsulat opposing him would be J . E .  Johnston-' 
with som e 55,000- troops. B rigadier1 General Irv in  McDowell would 
m arch  south to ■Fredericksburg with -some 40,800'} opposite Mm- would 
be Brigadier. General C harles W. Field-with only, a  s m a ll‘force of 
about 2,500.'- I t  was ■ their duty" to perform- reconnaissance service, 
continually checking' McDowell’s movements. The -third' Federal force 
w as to move by way of. the Shenandoah Yalley. M ajor General Nathaniel 
Banks was to-move h is 15 #000 men-down the Yalley-and unit# near 
Staunton with-the 15, 000 of Major -General' John €#-: Frem ont. If he 
-could d r iv e . Jackson up-the Valley* ‘he. was to move to F redericksburg  
and unite with McDowell. ■ -The Confederates under' Jackson could 
expect‘to-have-no mo r e : than IT* 5 88 men  to stop him’.'
If the th ree  Federal-fprees -could'successfully converge o n ■ 
Richmond*.-they could'Succeed, m ere ly  on-the strength of the ir over* 
whelming number s , It w’as Dee* s duty to prevent this} ■ Jaeksonw&s , 
to play the key role* While the cautious M cClellan was- delayed in
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front of Richmond, Jackson was to dispose of the commands of Frem ont
and Banks separately, and sim ultaneously to force M cD ow ellto
rem ain  near F reder icksburgby  threatening to cut off'his communications.
If Jackson could accom plish this, 'Lee was confident that McClellan
could he driven away from Richmond's gates, thus thwarting the
F ed era l's  grand plan* 23
To do th is, Jackson needed reinforcements;- • He a lso  needed
to fill in several vacancies in command* Johnston sent him a new
24brigadier general! his name was William B. Taliaferro* Jackson
said nothing of his d isp leasure to his staff, but to the Adjutant General
he vehemently expressed his sentim ents.
Through God's blessing my command, though sm all, Is efficient, 
and I respectfully  request its  efficiency may not be injured by 
assigning to It inefficient Officers, h a s t winter Gen. Taliaferro 
had charge of a Brigade and he perm itted  it to become so 
dem oralized that 1 had to abandon an im portant en terp rise  In eon* 
sequence of the inefficient condition in which he reported his 
Brigade. Notwithstanding the dem oralization condition of his 
Brigade he left and visited Richmond, thus making a second v isit 
there  within two months* His brigade Since he left i t ,  has, under 
o ther hands, become efficient, and it, as well as the others bids 
fair to r ender good serv ice if not placed under incompetent Officers.
I attach so much Im portance to this m atte r as to induce me to send 
this communication direct. The same statem ent will be forwarded 
through Gen. Johnston* 2^
23Freeroan, R. E. L ee, 11. 8 -24 .
24Official R ecords, XH. Part ill, 844.
25Vandlver, Mighty Stonewall, p. 212. Latter from Stonewall
Jackson dated A pril 14, 1852**Hotchkiss papers, L ibrary  of Congress.
T aliaferro was no m ore pleased with the p rospec t of once again serving
under Jackson. He undoubtedly Celt the chilly atm osphere that m ust
have prevailed at headquarter si, Anger got the b e s t of him. He was
determ ined, • he la te r noted,
. * * to do my duty the best way I could and satisfy 
C m y m ltJ  by my conduct of any personal feelings against 
him, and try  to le t him Judge of me by my subsequent 
actions.
Another unfortunate aspect of the situation was that he was to command 
F u tk erso n 's ' brigade, which w as already in capable-hands,; T a lia fe rro • 
could'have'been m o re  effective commanding B urks's brigade,, as- 
Burks was on indefinite sick leave* But-his o rd e rs1 were-to'Command 
Fulkerson 's, and he-complied.- And'Jackson, after-having expressed 
his'd issatisfaction,, gave Taliaferro^ a chance to-prove him self. 
T aliaferro 's-brigade would-be erganized-tnto M ajor-General' I- R. 
T rim ble 's division.
Jackson decided- to elim inate Fremont, first.- Ewell moved M s 
8,000 m en to  C onrad 's S tore In the Valley, where he- would' be on 
B urks's Bank should the la tte r advance on Stauntoni Jackson with 
7, 000 men moved to join Edward Johnson's 3, 000 a t McDowell. The 
leading elem ents of F rem ont's force came-in contact with Johnson 
early  the morning of May 8* T aliaferro 's  brigade, in advance of the
^ L e t te r  to Holmes Conrad from William B. Taliaferro , 
July 11, 1877, T aliaferro  Papers,
Army of the Valley, was ordered to Johnson's aid* Taliaferro  moved 
his brigade up to the re a r  of Johnson's force. Soon o rders  came to 
proceed rapidly to the front* TJnder heavy fire, the men pressed  
forward,'- Stumbling up the rocky tra il in.the gathering darkness, they 
finally reached' the summit of Bull Run' Pasture* :
Upon reaching the-, battlefield, T aliaferro  discovered the 
Federate engaging the Confederate troops to the left and front of 
his position* T aliaferro  quickly ordered the Twenty-Third Virginia 
Infantry to reinforce and support the position imm ediately to their 
front. The ■Twenty-Third pushed forward, opening up a heavy .fire 
on the enemy to the front and on a spur of a hill just'to- the-right* 
Meanwhile, Colonel Fulkerson moved his Thirty-Seventh Virginia 
Infantry toward a wooded hill on the right. It was T aliaferro 's  
intention that the Thirty-Seventh prevent the Federals from turning
* V
the Confederate right and drive the  enemy from his-position on the 
hill. The troops, eager -to do. battle,- quickly achieved their' objective* 
By now, T aliaferro  had called forward' the Tenth V irginia Infantry, 
which had been held in reserve* Four of its  companies w ere ordered
to support Johnson's advance on the left* the re s t w ere sent forward
!
to aid the Twenty-Third on Its right. The Tenth was subsequently 
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27Federals to advance up the valley between the two hilts*
The battle lasted  from 4? 30 to 8:30 P* M. Every movement 
of the Federals was promptly m et and defeated* In the waning 
m inutes of the conflict Johnson was wounded and T aliaferro took 
over command* Under instructions from Jackson to hold the hill
2g
a t a ll costs* Taliaferro  proceeded to make the necessary dispositions.
Taliaferro  stationed several regim ents In advance of the main force
under cover of the ravines and crevices and advanced h is skirm ishers*
But the conflict was overt the Federals had retreated;- • • By H P* M*
Jackson ordered T aliaferro  to move his men back for relaxation*
Johnson personally commended T aliaferro  for hie gallantry*
Taliaferro’s efforts to stop the F ederal attem pt to turn the Confederate
right flank* and the discipline and sp irit of his men w ere lauded in
Johnson’s report.
Tactically the engagement had not been Important. And the
498 Confederate casualties (181 In T aliaferro’s command} to only
30256 Federal casualties did not reflect any tactical m asterpiece.
But Jackson had successfully stopped one of the two forces converging
27 Official R ecords, XU, P a r t i ,  480-481.
28 Evans, e d . , Confederate M ilitary H istory, TO, 231.
29Official Records, XII, P art i. 483.
Ib id .» pp. 476, 481-482$ Freeman* Lee’s 'Lieutenants* I# 384.
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ton Staunton* Now he turned- northw ard;to face the other threat*
ilachson l e f t ,lohneon*s forces to protect the southern approach 
to the Valley,, m arched up to New M arket to join up with Ewell# and 
crossed  over the M assanutten Mountains to Luray. It was;the 
beginning of his famous and b rillian t Valley Campaign. From  JUiray, 
jacks on m arched down the Valley to Front Royal. At Front Royal, 
on May 23, a sm all Federal outpost was taken by su rp rise  and driven 
back. On May 25, Jackson pushed on to Winchester# driving the 
Federals before him. Occupying that town, he made dem onstrations 
against H arper’s Ferry# threatening a possible attack on Washington. 
Gathering together his captured supplies and ordnances# Jackson 
hurriedly  moved back up the Valley to -avoid being snared in a. Federal ■ 
convergence -which was rapidly closing1, upon the Valley Imhfs 're a r .
This campaign stopped Banks and forced McDowell to postpone his
m arch on Richmond. T aliaferro  m issed  the May action after the
% 1battle at McDowell because of a short illness. He did not report 
for duty until. Jackson had begun marching southward from W inchester, 
slipping down the w estern side of the M assanattens between* the Union 
forces, Jackson positioned his forces between C ross Keys and Port
3 ^ P e rso n a l Rem iniscences of Stonewall Jackson** foy William B. 
T aliaferro , Taliaferro-. P apers. This-’ is the only source which, sheds 
any light on T aliaferro’s whereabouts during Jackson’s Valley Campaign. 
In his Rem iniscences, Taliaferro  m erely  mentions that he m issed  part 
of the campaign 11 because of illn ess . 11
Republic. Once again he hoped to he ablo to m eet the enemy forces 
individually; thus# outnumbering them# Jackson could again Inflict 
■defeat upon them.
Contact was established w ith  the Federals-on June 8 around 
Port Republic* Taliaferro# hearing the gunfire# ordered'HIS 
regim ents formed and moved toward the bridge ac ro ss  the North 
River leading into town. The Thirty-Seventh Virginia under Colonel 
Fulkerson was in the advance* Half way to the bridge# Taliaferro  
m et Jackson minus Ms hat and p art of his staff# spurring up th e ‘road. 
Surprised by some F ederal'cavalry  and a r til le ry  which had penetrated 
the town# Jackson and his staff had. barely  escaped* While Jackson 
pushed on to  forward reinforcements# T aliaferro  ordered his brigade 
forward.
The' Thirty-Seventh charged the bridge# captured the a r til le ry  
piece commanding it# and drove -the- Federals from the village. The 
F ederals escaped by crossing an unprotected upper ford.- Taliaferro# 
believing that th e  lower ford and the bridge w ere the- only' ways, into 
town# did not discover Ms e r ro r  until it was too late* In his report# 
T aliaferro  sta tes  that ,#had I known the topography we could have 
captured m oat of the e n e m y . T a l i a f e r r o  proceeded to  occupy the
32ibid.
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G enera l  sketch  of r eg io n  around P o r t  Republic .  B a t t le s  of C r o s s  K eys ,  
Ju n e;8, 1862, and P ort  Republ ic ,  June 9, 1862. (Source: L e e ’s
L ie u t e n a n t s , I, 453. ) T a l i a f e r r o ’s B r ig a d e  occupied  the v i l l a g e  of 
P ort  Republ ic  during m o s t  of the two d a y s ’ f ighting. Cal led  upon to 
r e i n f o r c e  J a ck so n  in his  f ight a g a in s t  Shields^, T a l ia fe r ro  fo l lowed  
a p p ro x im a te ly  s a m e  route  as  Taylor .  He a r r iv e d  ju st  a s  the F e d e r a l s  
b egan  to fal l  back.
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town as ordered. The Tenth Virginia was posted In the town; the 
Twenty.** Third was dispatched to protect the fords near the town; and 
the a r tille ry  was placed on a hill to the north of P ort Republic 'where 
It could-command the upper fords*'-' These dispositions, gave T aliaferroc
a good defensive position and, at the sam e tim e, prevented him from 
being cut off from the main body of the arm y. The next day, Tune 9,
i _ .. f
Jackson left Ewell to withdraw slowly and continue to block any further 
aggression by Frem ont, who had been beaten by Ewell the previous 
day |n  the Battle of C ross Keys,, while he struck out-at M ajor*General 
Tames Shields just northeast of P ort Republic. Taliaferro, whose 
brigade was now a part of Major* General 1. K. Trim ble’s division, 
rem ained with his troops at Port Republic as ordered. Finding the 
resis tan ce  of Shield’s F ederals m ore obstinate than expected,
.Jackson called for reinforcem ents from Ewell, and ordered  Trimble 
to evacuate Port Republic* burning the bridges to prevent Frem ont 
from joining Shields. This was done by Trim ble, who sent T aliaferro’s 
brigade ahead. By the tim e Taliaferro*s men reached the battlefield, 
Tackspn had been reinforced sufficiently to enable him to turn Shield’s 
left flank. The enemy had begun to retreat* T aliaferro’s troops d is­
charged f*an effective volley Into the ranks of the wavering and retreating  
enemy1*; but this was the ir only opportunity to take part in the narrow  
but l,glorious,, victory.
34lb ld .. pp. 715, 774.
T aliaferro  had m issed 'the m ajority  o f the 'battle  a during ;fhe 
campaign, participating in the opening and closing convicts* At 
McDowell he had skillfully moved his troops up to reinforce Johnson 
and had prevented the Federals from turning the Confederate righ t 
flank* A fter Johnson was wounded, T aliaferro  had assum edcom m and, 
and had continued to thwart the F ederal attem pts to advance. He 
had handled his troops competently and continued to do so at Fort 
Republic# although his action for the m ost part was lim ited to 
holding that town. In both conflicts^ T aliaferro  displayed his 
competence and gallantry.
Tackson wanted to push back up the Valley after the d isordered 
Federals and threaten the re a r  of Washington# but t e e  could not 
spare  sufficient; troops to make it a profitable venture* Lee was 
facing McClellan# who had driven alm ost to the outskirts of 
Richmond. Jackson and his now famous Army of the Valley w ere 
called to the environ© of Richmond. L ee had made his decision.
The re su lt was the Seven Days* Battle# which effectively bottled 
up McClellan a t  Harrison*© Landing., Taliaferro, once again absent 
because, of illness,- was, to m iss this;-entire battle-* ^  He-rejoined
^ L e t te r  from Mrs* William Booth Taliaferro# -dated June 2?* 
1862* L etter to William B. T aliaferro  from Jam es Lyons# dated 
June 25, 1862# T alia ferro  Rapers* T aliaferro  was In sickbed a t the 
home of one of his relatives? the cause of his Illness is not mentioned.
Jackson* s command in' July, • Just in /time' to  participate;, in Lee* e next, 
offensive thrust^ wMcii was designed to cleat* Virginia o f  the-Federal 
trodps.':
CHAPTER IV
SUCCESS FROM CEDAR MOUNTAIN TO FREDERICKSBURG
Deeds'-offensive th rust to the north*.' a fter driving McClellan 
away from Richmond in the Seven Days* Battle, b e g a n in e a rly  
August* 1862. Jackson’s corps was to lead this push*, His firs t 
objective was to step B rigadier General John Pope, who was 
moving toward the im portant ra ilroad  center at GerdonSviile^-.where' 
the Orange and Alexandria joined the Virginia Central* The hope 
was that Jackson could strike  Pope*® advance corps under Banks 
at Culpeper before the la tte r  could get reinforcem ents. Upon his 
approach Jackson discovered that.-Hope.had'ordered Banks forward 
to Cedar Mountain, about eight m iles south of Culpeper, By noon 
of August *?, the Federals had two divisions of about 8,,000 men a t  
Cedar Mountain with another division coming up in support. *
Still believing that only the advance units of Pope had reached 
Culpeper, Jackson p ressed  forward eagerly. Ewell* a divisionTed 
the m arch  with Early’s brigade at the head of the column., B rigadier 
General Charles S* Winder*s division (form erly Jackson’S)--followed - 
on the heels of Ewell. Winder,, pale and sick,, had ju st been form ally
*Johnson & Buel, e d s ., Battles and L eaders,,/H,. 4, 5, 9.
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given the command that morning. Taliaferro was his senior brigadier*
A. P. MiR’s division was severa l m iles back, within easy supporting
distance. In all, some 24,006 Confederate troops crossed Robertson
River the morning of August 9* The three brigades under Winder
began their m arch that morning from their camp a t'B arn e tt’s Ford
on the Rapldan River bn the turnpike leading to Culpeper. Three
m iles pais t the Robertson River, they came upon Swell’s division
which had already confronted the enemy near the hills of Cedar Run.
Dispositions had already been made, and Ewell’s a r tille ry  had begun
firing. The brigades of Ewell’s division had formed on the right.
. 3Winder’s troops w ere to form on the left. Winder quickly ordered 
his division up the turnpike to a point at which the woods on the right 
of the road terminated* Beyond this lay a b arren  field to the right 
and a cornfield to the front. E arly ’s brigade, protected by several 
h ills, occupied the right of this bare  field. The Confederates formed 
their line of battle* supposedly opposite the Federal lines, which 
w ere on the other side of a cornfield.
Winder now ordered his Second Brigade, under J . M*  ^Garnett, 
to move forw ard to the left under cover of the woods to, the wheat i
field. Here the brigade was to extend itself back to the edge of the
!  ! ,
2F reem an, Lee’s L ieutenantSj H, 22-23*
^Johnson & Buel, ed s ., Battles and L eaders, II, 4, 5, 9*
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woods, Winder ordered Ms batteries to move up to where the bare 
field began ahd to begin firing. Taliaferro was ordered to m arch 
paralle l to the road in the re a r  of the batteries and under cover of 
the woods to a point within supporting distance of the Second Brigade.
AH of these dispositions w ere'm ade under heavy F ed era l■ a rtille ry  * 
fire# thrown at random Into the woods. .Once the" Confederate'guns 
began their effective shelling# the Federal guns slackened their* 
fir e. *
Upon reaching his designated position, T aliaferro halted the 
men and awaited further orders. He soon received news that 
Winder had been shot, and that he was now in  command of the 'F irs t 
D ivision. Although second in command, T aliaferro  had not been 
informed of the division operations’much beyond the .d isposition  of 
his own brigade. In his official repo rt of the battle, he Stated that 
<f £ l  was_7 Ignorant of the plans dn general, ex cep ted  fan as I Could 
form an opinion from  my observations of the dispositions made, u 
He imm ediately rode to the front to acquaint him self with the position 
of Garnett*@‘b rig ad e  and to reconnoiter the enemy1 s position which was 
obscured by the w heat field in front of the F irs t Virginia Battalion of 
that brigade* There was no sign of the Federals in front of the wheat
^ O fficial R eco rd s , XII, p a r t  it, 198,
5Ib id . , p. 189,
7Z
field, 'but Taliaferro ^ dt sc over ed; them-.t** the right of this -positiorrih
the cornfield, partia lly  concealed by the rolling countryside. ■'
Taliaferro had returned to the position of his batteries when 
■he-was /informed that the F ederals w ere  beglnning to show them selves 
In Trent-of the F irs t V ir ginia# which/he had just left.. - He. quickly  
ordered  the. Tenth Virginia Infantry regiment' o f Ms -Third Brigade; 
forward to 're in fo rc e  the F irs t  Virginia battalion and told Colonel J. 
Roland to  rapidly move his F irs t Brigade to support Garnett.
At the same time the F ederals began moving through the 
cornfield. Noticing their advance# T alia ferro  ordered G arnett'to  
throw the-right wing of? Ms Second Brigade forward to d riv e  them' 
back. He also 'o rdered  the Third Brigade, now under Colonel 
A lexander G. T aliaferro’s command, - to move into the open Held 
on the right and drive back the Federals in  the ir front. General 
T aliaferro  commented upon the gallantry of the Twenty*First 
Virginia Infantry Regiment of. the Second' Brigade as-they-poured 
destructive f ire  upon the enemy* T aliaferro1 brigade 'a lso  advanced 
in  Superb -fashion-causing the enemy to give way before a.' sev ere  fire.
But while the battle went well on the right* d isa s te r was: 
impending on the left. Roland’s brigade was not near enough to
^ W illia m  B. T aliaferro’s Third brigade was now placed under 
the command of Colonel Alexander G. Taliaferro, a relative. A. G. 
Taliaferro-wa.S'.senior colonel in the brigade.
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Sketch of B a t t le f ie ld  of Gedar Mountain. (Source: L e e ' s
L ie u te n a n t s , II, 31. Taken from H otchk iss '  m ap  in Off ic ia l  
R e c o r d s  A t l a s , P la te  L X X X V -4 .  ) This is  b e s t  m ap  ava i lab le ,  
but i s  not e n t ir e ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  It shows p o s i t io n s  of the  
C on fed era te  B r i g a d e s  a f ter  they had been  turned by the  
F e d e r a l  a s sa u l t .  The F e d e r a l  fo r c e s ,  ho w ev er ,  a r e  shown  
in the p o s i t io n s  held  b e fo r e  they charged.
Garnett* 8 Second Brigades this allowed the Federal# to turn the left 
wing of Garnett* The Second began falling back, slightly d isordered, 
which exposed the left flank of T aliaferro1# brigade and caused it,, 
also , to fall back m om entarily before regaining its  original position* 
At this c ritica l moment Boland*# brigade moved up; alm ost 
sim ultaneously Branch*s brigade of Hill*# division moved up to 
engage the Federal#. These fresh  troops w ere sufficient to drive 
back the Federal# whose ranks w ere becoming confused because of 
the sev ere  conflict with the Second Brigade* ^
A# Taliaferro*# brigade advanced to the edge of the hill over* 
looking the cornfield and Garnett*# brigade to the edge of the woods,
g
Ewell threw forward his brigade# on the right. ' The Federal# w ere 
driven back from  their positions in confusion. To cover their re trea t, 
the enemy cavalry charged against Taliaferro*# brigade*. But their 
valor brought no successi caught in a devastating c ro ssfire , they 
w ere d ispersed  with heavy losses. This was the la s t offensive effort 
of the F ederals, and they -began retreating* Taliaferro*# division 
crossed  the cornfield diagonally toward the woods on the other side* 
meanwhile Ewell*# troops advanced en echelon* The Confederates 
continued to drive the Federals back for some th ree  m iles until,
Taliaferro w rites, "tiarfcttess m ade further pursuit im p ossib le . *»9
Even with darkness Jackson was. determ ined to make the 
m ost of the advantage he had barely- won.- H ill's  fresh  troops, w ere 
ordered  to lead-the column and drive the F ederals hack-to Culpeper. 
Although meeting, resistance,'- they continued to p re ss  forward. Only 
the news . that a second Federal-corps had arriv ed  caused-Jackson 
to order his troops to  bivouac. At the end of the day., the Federal 
lo sses totaled 2, 381, - which Included some 480 p risoners. In 
com parison, -the Medical Birector- of the Confederate Army reported 
a  total, of.1,278**229 dead, 1$47 wounded, T aliaferro 's  and G arnett's 
brigades suffered alm ost half (Oil) of the casualties. **
Viewed tactically , ra th e r - than la  te rm s of casualties, ■ the 
battle at Cedar Mountain was not really 'm uch of a  success for 
Jackson. Jackson.should have been-able to- use his superior 
num bers to take fuller advantage of Banks* gross reck lessness.
The in itial Federal assau lt on the Confederate left -had.been -ill 
p repared  and should have been crushed Immediately.- But this, was 
not the result,. Instead*1 two Confederate brigades' had been thrown.
9lb ld ., pp. 189-190.
Freem an, B ee's L ieutenants, H, 40-43 . 
u Offlctal R ecords. XII, part li, 179-180,
^ F reem a n , L ee's  Lieutenants, H, 44.
into confusion. The reaso n ,- -of - course,' lies In the fac t that' th e :'
Confederate left flank had been In •the a i r .  Freem an expresses
the belief-that no Initial reconnaissance had been made to th e  left,
although 'the woods w ere so- thick that .surprise might have been
expected*, He believes that Jackson should have ..acquainted him self
personally w ith, the conditions on an ■ exposed .flank 'that was threatened*
As for- T a liaferro 's  share  of'responsibility , F reem an  sta tes that
i .. ... the. change made by'that officer, in G arnett's line w as ' 
o rdered  hurriedly under m arked disadvantage. When a 
senior B rigadier is 'kep t in Ignorance of the part the Division, 
is to play in action* how can he be blamed H, on sudden call,
■ he does not follow a .plan Be does.,not know. .Jackson 's reticence**** 
not to say seeretlveness^*w as responsible in p art for the rout 
of h is  left 'Wing* ‘ ;.
The facts connected with this rout seem  to relieve T aliaferro  
of any m ajor responsib ility .; F irs t, he was Ignorant not only of the 
general plan of attack, but also  of-the disposition of: the brigades 
them selves. A fter making, a p re lim inary  reconnaissance, he ordered  
Roland's .brigade Up In  support of G arnett's brigade.- In his.'report 
following'the battle , Taliaferro-notes- that when he discovered that: 
the le f t wing of the-brlgade had-been turned#- he wondered.lf perhaps 
Roland had not -received his order.. ** But obviously, the .order had 
been received as Roland, was su rp rised  when G arnett's  brigade began.
1:3Ib id ., pp. 44*45*
14O fflcial R ecords, XU. Part li. 189.
to foil backf he had been under the im pression that the right of hie 
brigade; had. r  e s ted , on the; le ft. of Garnett* s . **
.It seem# then that, T aliaferro, .(assuming. command of the. 
division, with little.foreknowledge,;)', correctly/evaluated the.situation 
and .ordered the necessary  dispositions. , Roland's brigade, marching 
up,, was alsoham pered  by the lack  of. knowledge oTthe terrain.;. Its 
com mander, moving his troops as ordered, lacked tim e to  place 
Ms right on the left: o f G arn e tt^ b rlg ad e .
The Battle of Cedar Mountain decided nothing. Jackson was 
forced to .withdraw; because the re s t  o fP o p e 's  force#  were, coming up. 
to support Banks. As soon a s  Long s tre e t’s corps could be sent from 
Richmond, Lee wanted to make another offensive th rust at Pope before 
McClellan, could reinforce h im .. The p lan  was to trap  Pope between 
the Rappahannock and Rapidan River,#.
On the morning of August 20, T aliaferro 's  division began 
its  maneuvering, crossing  the- Rapidan River a t Som erville Ford, 
and bivouacking.,at Stevensburg in .Culpeper County. The next morning# 
T aliaferro 's  d iv ision  moved to the front (leading Ew ell's and A. P. 
H ill's), near Brandy Station on the Orange and Alexandria Rail* 
road and pushed forward to Cunningham Ford on the Rappahannock
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River. 16
-.As T aliaferro1© leading brigade approached the ford, ltd is»
covered Federal©, on the o ther -side* '• 'The Federal infantry held 'the
edge of a" eornfield and a  skirt, of the woods which approached the"
riv er bank and the hills overlooking the ford. T aliaferro  halted his
troops under cover of some woods and moved his a r tille ry  to the
front. After a short resistance# the Confederates were able to 1
©lienee the Federal guns* In the struggle one of theenem y caissons
■ 17was blown up and their infantry dlspersed in confusion. tinder the 
direction  of M ajorrO eneral Stuart* the cavalry reconnoitered. They
i
rem ained for sev era l hours rounding up p risoners and arm s. Upon 
returning* they told T aliaferro  they had discovered the enemy re** 
grouping- and; moving up large, m asses along the- river. Taliaferro ' 
im m ediately detailed a force of sharpshooters .from 'the Third''Brigade 
to hold the riv er bank.
Skirm ishing1 continued,- for the - tm t  of'the day.' Toward' night 
the-Federal sk irm ishers 'w ere  reinforced by a brigade of infantry.
The Confederates answered-this move by'opening up-with their 
a r tille ry  until darkness fell.
'On- the following morning*. August Z% T aliaferro  -was ordered
^Johnson  and Buel, e d s ., Battles and headers, H, 501-511.
17Official R ecords. XII, P art ii, 654.
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to  hold his position as Ewell’s and Hill’s troops passed on h is left 
toward F arley  Ford on the Hazel River. Taliaferro,w as to follow.
That .morning,he engaged in  what he described as a "w a rm a rtille ry  
duel” with the F ederals which, according to published reports* 
resu lted  in a- considerable slaughter: tofche enemy*', The Federals'. 
suffered lo sses about M  to 1 com pared to the Confederates. ’ He:;. 
then moved on to Farley  Ford* passing the other divisions who 
m ade way for him. .By the tim e-he reached the ford*, Trim ble and:' 
john B. Hood’s brigades had a lread y  engaged the Federals and had 
driven them'back* Lee ordered.. T aliaferro  to rem ain at, the; ford 
until morning and* together with Hood, re p re ss  any further enemy 
demonstrations.; No further advances‘.were made by th e  F ederals on 
the,23rd*; and T aliaferro’s m eivproceeded to S eo tt’e fa rm  near White 
Sulphur Springs. 18
Meanwhile* back at Lee’s headquarters* m ore im portant 
events -had occurred.., Stuart had raided: Pope’s headquarters and 
■had seized.a m iscellaneous m ass, of Popa’s m ilitary  papers, including 
a dispatch book. Lee examined the papers carefully. Theyconfirmed 
his suspicions that Pope was the stronger. McClellan’s reinforcem ents 
would make the odds hopeless. Pope had already managed to avoid 
being .trapped between the r iv e rs . Lee still had'to find some way to
18lb id .. p. 655
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attack 'Pope before Federal relnf or cem ents arrived , b u th e  was unable 
to croea the Rappahannock because 'of P o p e 's  defensive actions* Bee 
desired  to avoid any  general engagements If .possible'. 5 A war of
m aneuver was the;o^y;Way.rhe- Qonfederuiee could succeed*.-; After 
an unsuccessful attempt to sweep Pope's left flank. JLee decided to  
Send J'ackson's corps, of about 23, 000, around Pope's right. ^  
/Following, lues's o rders , T aliaferro1 s . m en  m oved out on 
August E4. They pushed forw ard to within one m ile  of J Offersonton.
The next day,; s t i l l  in the re a r , ' they., crossed  the ford,above Waterloo, 
m arched 26 m iles, and bivouacked near Salem* Only Jackson knew 
that their objective was to cut pope's communications* The o rders to 
the division'chiefs w e re  sim ply, ■! "m arch  to a c ro ss« r6a d ;a  staff officer 
the re  will inform you which fork to takej and so on to the next fork, 
w here you-will find a courier with a. sealed direction .pointing'out the 
road*#f^  • Taliaferro-notes that th is  extrem e reticence was • very 
uncomfortable and often annoyed Jackson 's subordinates as It was 
som etim es ca rried  too far* But it: was, he concedes, the rea l secre t 
of Jackson 's reputation* ^
They resum ed their m arch the next day, August 2b, ; this tim e
l9 Freem an, IL L ee, U, 289*303.
Johnson & Buel, c d s . , B attles and L eaders, XI, 501.
21Ibld ., p. 502.
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a t figh t angle e to  the direction o f the preceding day toward Bull Bun 
Mountains. By the time , the 'three divisions reached  Gainesville, 
sev era l cavalry brigades under. S tu artV  dir action had caught up with • 
them* All of Jackson1 s subsequent m ovem ents-w ere greatly  aided  by 
the skillful employment of the cavalry. Pouring through Thorough* 
fa re  Gap onto.- the'plains extending to M anassas Junction,- they m arched 
to within a m ile of B ristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria 
Kallroad. The adjacent cornfields supplemented their Scanty rations*
At B ristoe Station they stopped two Federal trains, although 
another managed to avoid capture. Jackson now moved north along 
the ra ilro ad  to M anassas Junction, where there was a vast depot of 
q u arte rm aste r1® com m issary and ordnance sto res. T aliaferro1®
F irs t Brigade, under Colonel William Baylor, was ordered  to lead 
via a country road to M anassas Junction. * Baylor encountered a force 
of enemy cavalry about a m ile from the Junction, but easily d ispersed
23
them* Be then pushed beyond, Into the Junction. The-Federals 
w ere not taken by surprise# but their force was too sm all'and they 
w ere quickly defeated# For the p rice  of fifteen wounded, the Con­
federates captured Immense sto res , eight pieces of a rtille ry  and 300 
prisoners* A counter attack was beaten back; 200 m ore p risoners and
zzIb id .. p. 502.
^ O ffic ia l R ecords, XII, Part l i ,  655-656.
the-" train. 'which had transported  them ■ from Alexandria w ere taken ': 
during the fight.
: Taliaferro  assum ed bommandU&t M anassas Junction,-: He had
the ra ilroad  bridge -over'Bull 'Run R ivet; This com plefcedthe!
severing of' all communications' w ith Alexandria. Furtherm ore,' he
established th e :necessary  pickets '• tdf prevent any 'su rp rise ‘-attack,
made preparations to tran sp o rt the captured supplies, distributed
some of the food to the troops, and then made preparations to fire
24the remaining sto res .
Thus far Jackson*® actions w ere nothing m ore than those of 
a raiding party. His purpose of attacking Pope and holding him until 
Longsireetfs corps could come up from behind and crush  him had 
not yet been accomplished. .Several’problems* as T aliaferro  recall® 
in h is-artic ie , 'confronted Jackson: ■ {!> i t  was' necessary-to  place his 
forces on one of. Pope* s flanks to protect him self If X*ongstreet, s men 
w ere-late In a rr iv in g ;: (2) at: the1,sam e-tim e, Jackson-had to be able 
to s trike  effectively a t Pope; (3) he had to--remain near Trongsfreet in 
case quick reconcentration became necessary; (4) if Longstreet w ere 
unable to reach him, Jackson would have to be in a position either to 
rem ove the obstacles in Bongstreet1® path or to withdraw his troops
safely. ^  The point that seemed to  heat satisfy these requ irem en ts 
was w.egt of Bull, Run River-and north of the  W arreaion. turnpike*:
-That night, .August 27* , Jackson, began making, the n ecessa ry  
dispositions. ■He had allowed. the men le isu re; tim e. that' day. : C ertain  
that his flanks had been so well.-guarded, that the enemy was. under tain* 
If not unaware, of his position, Jackson could afford to r  est his men. 
A*. P. .Hill’s division was. instructed1-to m arch  to C e n te rv ille ; Ewell’s 
division was to c ro ss  Bull Run-River at Blackburn’s Ford,and move 
upstream  to the stone bridge. ^ T a l i a f e r r o ’s division was to'move 
down to the W arrenton and Alexandria Turnpike via an old country 
road to Sudley Mill. At daybreak on August 28, Taliaferro’s division 
had reached the battlefield of Fir®! M anassas. Taliaferro-threw  for­
ward his Second Brigade,- under Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, 1 to 
Oroveton. . The Third Brigade, under.Colonel T aliaferro, was 
poc|tf,oned at Sudley Mill, while the F irs t and Fourth Brigades w ere 
stationed about a half m ile beyond the Turnpike and Aldie Road.
As.usual,. - Jackson’s.m arching o rders revealed very little  
of.his plans#.,.F reem an statesr,
Nobody knew where they had m arched or when or why. .
^ Jo hnson  and Buel, e d s ., ! Battles and L eaders, ..|l, 505. 
26Ib id ., p. 505.
27O fficial R ecords. XU, Part ii, 656.
85
;'There-wa£, '’In Short* wor se confusion than had prevailed'oh- 
any of Jackson’s m arches save that of August 8, m  route to 
■m e e t ; Hope .at Cedar ’Mountain* ^  L " i;v
Before the scattered  divisions could he regrouped, the Federals made
contact-With'some o f ' T aliaferro’s'troops; • Mistaking H ill’s.'march to
Centerville for that of Jackaon’s en tire  corps* the F ederals had been
O rdered'to concentrate "at M anassas to pursue. ^9 T he 'in itia l'F ederal
dem onstrations; w'd’re  checked by'the ..Second'’Brigade who w ere  picketing
the W arrenton road toward Gainesville. A captured m essenger informed
Colonel Johnson that the F ederals w ere planning to cro ss  Bull Run
at the stone bridge and at Sudley* s Ford. When the news reached
Jackson, he ordered Taliaferro  16 ’’move your division and attack the
enemy. ” -Bwell-was to follow a n d s u p p o r t  the attack* * if  the available
forces could re s is t  the opening Federal onslaught, Jackson would fee
able to-reunite his ecatfcered forces and s trik e  a 'decisive blow a t Pope*
T aliaferro’s troops m arched through the woods to attack the 
F edera l left flank as it advanced tow ard Sudley from the direction of 
Gainesville# Pushing; forward with the- F irs t, Third and Fourth 
Brigades, T aliaferro  discovered the Federals had abandoned their
^ .F reem an, Tee’s Lieutenants, U, 104.
^Jo h n so n  and Buel, e d s .». Battles and*L eaders, 11, -507.
Official Records, 5C11, P art ii, 656.
 ^^Johnson and Buel," e d s ., Battles and L eaders, 11, 508.
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original intentions of concentrating at .Manassas* Instead he found the 
enemy' moving off to the right of the W arrenton turnpike. The F ederals 
had run into Johnson's pickets, and mistaking them for a reeonnoltertag 
party,, had 'turned westward., Taliaferro  Immediately threw- forw ard 
his troops, followed by Swell, In the direction of the turnpike. Battle 
lines formed, parallel to the road.
In short order, the Federal sk irm ishers  advanced and w ere 
alm ost immediately supported by a la rge force which crossed  the 
turnpike and advanced toward the Confederate lines* T aliaferro  
deployed B aylor's brigade on the extrem e right with, the Fourth Brigade 
next to It. Johnson's brigade was still some distance to the left* at 
the outbreak of the fighting, having recently been withdrawn from its  
position at Oroveton. T aliaferro 's  brigade did not a rr iv e  until after 
the action had commenced* it wa& im m ediately moved to support the
32
batteries on the right and subsequently moved to the right of Baylor.
H ie 'ba tteries w ere placed in .position' In 'front of the Fourth Brigade 
ju st above the village of Oroveton. From  their vantage point they 
poured a destructive fire  upon the advancing Federal forces. Then, 
under heavy fife, they moved to the right of the F irs t  Brigade where 
they wer e able to Infiltrate the F ederal a r tille ry  and drive the guns 
from the field.,
O fficial R ecords, XII, Fart' 11, 656.
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■ By this- time both lines 'stood in the open fields. The Con*
federate troops, re la tes  'Taliaferro1, m oved‘forward ac ro ss  the
field With splendid gallantry and In perfect order. Twice they
advanced to the farm' house and orchard on their right while the
Federate  held p art of the orchard and’turnpike with--superior forces.
For two and a  half hours, both lines stood solidly, unflinching at
the deadly exchange of m inis balls, bayonets, and fists* It was a
bitterly  contested stand up fight..: Finally, about nine o 'clock that
night, the Federals slowly and reluctantly fell back and yielded the 
13
field.
As Freem an sta tes, the struggle taught nothing; tactically,
' •'  : • ; 34It m erely  dem onstrated the obstinacy of both forces* The
gallantry and heroism  displayed by the Confederate' troops w as,
In T aliaferro 's words, "beyond praise*11 In his rep o rt h e 'lis ts  the’
actions’ of His"own troops:-' Baylor's" brigade, the m ost exposed,.
sustained the reputation of the "Stonewall Brigade" it had gained
som e'twelve months previously*' ‘iohnson 's brigade, having had
picket duty the night befor e and having been involved in the early
sk irm ishes, was kept in -reserve; T aliaferro 's  brigade-advanced under
severe fire  and succeeded in driving the Federals from their position
33Ib id ., p. 657.
^Freem an, Lee's Lieutenants; 11, 109.
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In the orchard and on the turnpike; the Fourth also perform ed 
splendidly. ^5 Taliaferro, hims elf, received p ra ise  from Tackson 
for hie individual perform ance in a  fight which was ''fierce- and 
sanguinary. 1,38
The loss was heavy on both sides; T aliaferro 's  division had 
alm ost one th ird  of Its man killed o r wounded. Its fighting force 
had trim m ed to a little  over 400 men—barely the sice of a  m oderately 
strong brigade. 37 Furtherm ore* Its command was greatly  weakened* 38 
One of the m ore serious casualties was T aliaferro. Shot in the neck*
In the arm , and In the foot* he maintained h is command until the 
battle ended, but was forced to- re tu rn  to Richmond* where he was 
to rem ain convalescing until December.
40
By December I t ,  T aliaferro  had returned to his command. ‘
In the m eantim e Lee had moved into Maryland after defeating Pope
35 Official R ecords, XU,  Part 14, 657.
3h b id . , p. 645.
37H>ld. * pp. 661*664.
-^Freem an, Leefs Lieutenants, II* 109.
39Official R ecords, XU, Part II, 658.
* The exact date is  uncertain. On November 28, Lee reports 
W. B. Taliaferro to be s till absent. As late as December 9, M rs.
W. B* T aliaferro  reco rds In her diary  of visiting W. B. Taliaferro 
In Richmond.
a t Second'Manass&e. "Escaping a "close ca ll a t the Battle of Sharpsburg
in Sept em ber, the tattered Confederate troop© w lthdrew baek 'into
Virginia* :The campaign of the p as t few months had beendiffiealt.
C rossing back over the Potomac Into Virginia, Eee* s force w as not
the sam e'trim * w ell-o iled  fighting' machine that ‘had left- Richmond. 1
Supplies- w ere  scarce  If not nonexistent. The men them selves' w ere
suffering from fatigue-. Fortunately the Federals did not p re ss  their'
advantage-. By- the tim e they did* m ost of the deficiencies In Bee’s
a rm y  had been corrected . The ''Federate were' threatening '1 once again
by the tim e T aliaferro  had recovered- from his wounds and'had returned
to Bee. The Federal'plan-w as’ for Ambrose E. Burnside to attack '
Fredericksburg* 'w here the "Confederates had begun regrouping the ir
forces and supplies. Outnumbered' eight to five (125, 000 under Burnside;
78,000 under- Bee), the Confederates still had am ple re se rv es  due to
their strong defensive position. On December 11# Burnside began
laying bridges over the Rappahannock. 1
The following morning, Taliaferro* again acting as a  division
commander*; received o rd ers  to m arch his troops north from  Gainey*s
Station to Hamilton.1 s Crossing* -At. this point* they Joined A. P. mil*©
41division which was already in battle order* T aliaferro  formed his
4 i L ongstreet's corps commanded the Confederate le ft  fla n k .'
Hood’s division {Bongstreet’s corps) protecting the center of the line, 
-acted a s  liaison with lack s on* s. corps. Jackson placed A. P. Hill’s 
division on the line, holding T aliaferro, £>. H. Hill, and E arly  In 
reserve*
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ntroop# ,eo the ra ilroad  to Hill*# right. ' Subsequently* ho was or dared
to-move1 his. command to the re a r  and left of H ill1© line. f The m ere
fact that Taliaferro* s’ division (Jackson’s old division)' which had had
Its rank thinned by continual severe front line service* was placed
in the rear# dem onstrates that' Lee had. sufficient re se rv es  for a
change. Me then proceeded •to- a tat ion E. • F rank Paxton's and' William E.
■Starke's brigades in Hill’s rear# holding his other two brigades In 
42rese rv e . His a r tille ry  was placed to the left of the division. When 
a ll arrangem ents .had been Completed# '-Taliaferro notified Mill of the 
various positions. Much to A. P. H ill’s  satisfaction# a ll of l^ l ia f e r ro ’s 
brigade and battery  ■commanders' had been ordered  to recognise a n y  
demands for support without the need’ of o rd ers  from the ir im m ediate 
superiors.
Early the next morning* DecemberT3« T aliaferro  posted two 
o f‘h is ba tteries In 'the field ac ro ss  the ra ilro ad  to the right of 
B ernard’s quarte rs. One battery  ■ and. two pieces of another' battery 
w ere placed' on the hill Just left of- the railroad. 1 The other pieces 
protected the extrem e right flank of the Confederate forces* About 
f  A. M. # the F ederals began advancing toward Jacks on* s position 
on the-right of'the Confederate line.' The Confederate b a tteries  
im m ediately opened with such a  destructive f ire  that the Federal lines
4^Official R ecords, XXI, 675.
nwaver edand  broke. The Federal a rtille ry  now begancancentrating 
each a heavy- f ire  on the Confederate batteries, that they forced the 
Confederate a r tille ry  to re tire  to the re a r , behind-the railroad , after 
;two-' hoars .of action. tinder, co v e r.of this support* -the enemy infantry 
’again began to  advance: toward A. F . i Bill's-; l|ne*; T aliaferro  ordered 
ihle Infantry' to  advance iofchem llitary  roadf- although exposed to: the, 
h eavyF edera l shelling they would be within easy supporting distance 
of. .Mill1# line* : His troops moved#' Taliaferro  relates*: in compliance 
w ith 'their o rders w ith ^perfect stead iness and- en thusiasm .’*
Paxton, commanding the F irs t  - Brigade of TaHaferroVs -■ 
division* discovered that some of Che Confederate troops.,were falling 
back to. the right of.-Marcy G regg's brigade. -The enemy-was- advancing 
with-two regim ents beyond the front line through a gap which fronted- a 
boggy wood--supposedly ■inaccessible to- them. Paxton Immediately 
moved his brigade to the right to engage the penetrating Federal' 
forces., By-the tim e they reached that area# the F ederals w ere  
already re tiring  -under'the fordQus counterattack of Brigadier- General 
Tubal A. Early* sm e n . ': Baxton.continued' to push forward to the 
front and for the re s t  Of the day his m en occupied that p lace  In the 
front line. The m ain effort of the enemy that day had been on the 
Confederate left. ''Fourteen tim es -the F ederals attem pted to take 
Marye*e Hill. ■ Fourteen tim es 'their unsuccessful charges m et with 
disaster.: -Finally* by?:-P .M .* the assault*  stopped.
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The other brigades of Taliaferro* s division w ere held in rese rv e
until the morning of December 14* At that time, they relieved A* P.
/■
H ill's troops a t the front. Starke was placed to the left of the 
railroad! Jones* Taliaferro* and Paxton occupying the ra ilroad  
and connecting with Early*s troops on the right. At daybreak the 
F ederais made a slight dem onstration on Taliaferro*s left; their 
sk irm ishers advanced alm ost to the ra ilro a d ,, but w ere easily  driven 
back. By m id-day the skirm ishing, which at tim es had been brisk , 
ceased.
D. H. HiU*s division, relieved T aliaferro  the next morning. 
T a lia f e r r o 's  men moved back to Mine road where once again they 
could r elax. 44 Later that day Burnside began withdrawing from 
F redericksburg. He had su ffe re d 12, 600 casualties* L ee 's  forces 
had sustained 5, 600 casualties, but m ost w ere only slightly wounded*
The withdrawal of Burnside m arked the end of the I86£‘Vlrgiat& 
cam paigns--cam paigns which on the whole could be reg is te red  as 
Confederate successes* But the p rice  of success came high. Many 
men had been lost, men who could no longer be readily replaced. 
C asualties had a lso  caused a' general depletion in the ranks 'of the 
officers. Between Cedar Mountain and Sharpsburg, Winder and
4% bld., p. 676. 
44Ib id .. p. 676.
Garland’had. died* Ewell* Taliaferro*. Trim ble rand Field had, ell b;een 
wounded. At Sharpsburg the casualties had been numerous. Three . 
generals (O, B, Anderson* W* B. Starke* and L* O 'Brien Branch) 
had been; killed! •. • five, g en e ra ls . {Richard H. Anderson*: R obert, Toombs, 
A m brose R. Wright* R. S. Ripley* and Alexander Lawton) had been 
wounded..: Below'-the. brigade.■level, - the. casualties had been'even 
g rea ter. The nine divisions w ere headed by four m ajor-generals, 
four brigadier generals, and one colonel! the fo rty -th ree  brigades w ere 
led by seventeen brigadier generals and: twenty*six men w ith the rank 
of colonel or lower.
Lee could scarcely  afford to allow his arm y to operate under 
conditions of tem porary command. , lie had attem pted to alleviate 
th is condition by submitting a l is t  of new prom otions in October, but 
had not been entirely  successful in  achieving his requests because 
of P resident D avis's s tr ic t in terpretation of the m ilitary  law. . Davie 
would hot prom ote officers who w ere  physically disabled. This meant*
for one thing, deferring the promotion of B rigadier General 1. R.
46Trimble. L e e  avoided this ru le by having him appointed to command 
an unspecified., division .under Jackson. . There was no. recorded, 
opposition to either the device used by Lee or to the promotions
^ F re e m a n , ’L ed4® Lieutenants, 12, 250-254,
ihom selves♦- none 'except by Brigadier General William S.- Taliaferro. 
A & senior brigadier in Jackson1^  division, he believed that he -should 
have the divisional command. The early  months of 1863 saw Taliaferro  
attempting':to secure this promotion.' /-For Taliaferro it. was either 
the promotion or a transfer to another theatre.
CHAPTER V 
A VIRGINIA ARp.TOC.RAT TO 'THE END
1 T aliaferro ' w as: quite d is tu rb ed  when Trim ble was officially
i
given com m ando! Jackson*s division. • A s a lready  noted, T aliaferro  
was determ ined to  secu re  a  transfer If lie w as'not named to-command 
the division. He was' the ranking brigadier ■ of the'division and had 
been in command of i t  since'Winder* s. deaths except for th e  two months- 
he spent recuperating from  his wounds. By all-rights h e  should not 
have been passed over for pramotion~*the coveted rank of Major* 
General should have been his; Trim ble1 s promotion confirmed 
Taliaferro* s latent suspicions that Jackson had never completely 
forgiven him for h is p a rt in  the Romney episode.
In' reviewing Taliaferro* s; ca reer for the twenty months*, the - 
Romney incident shows up as the only black m ark  against h is 
professional reputation. Prom an examination of the evidence sur** 
rounding the protest#' i t  appears that T aliaferro  and the other, officers 
were..justified in.’their-dem and for-'better, conditions for the ir men*.
But'the m anner which they em ployed'to achieve these a im s ■ Was.
* Official -Records, XXI, 1009. The form al appointments wer e 
not made until April 23# 1863 when Congress convened# but the com* 
m issions w ere'dated from. January •17#- 1863* Trimble* e was announced
January 19# 1863.
certainly  not ju s tified .' The' petition to Earing was in accordance with' 
proper m ilita ry  procedure* although the wording was' a hit 'strong.
But by th is tim e the damage had been done.' A lready the-politicians 
In Richmond had word of the demoraliz;ed conditions existing within 
the ran k s/ ■ Taliaferro  a n d th e o th e r  officers had' gone over Jackson’s 
■authority without Jackson’s  knowledge* T aliaferro’s action cannot 
he eondoned in this case*
Other than this episode, T aliaferro’s career''s tands’up well 
under critical'evaluation . He was- certainly  no physical coward. 
Wounded seriously  a t th e  Battle of Groveton (August 28, 18621, he 
remained- on the field commanding his men until the'fighting subsided. 
The previous year,, -at the Battle of G reenbrier River'-‘(October 3, 
1861},- he 'had' been com mended'for h is gallantry and the 'inspiration  
he- provided his men.
T aliaferro  displayed' considerable tactical skill*-' Only at 
Cedar Mountain (August % 1862) had h is troops suffered from faulty 
deployment. On1 that occasion -the left flank-of the F irs t  Brigade' was 
turned because of a  gap between If and the  Second Brigade.' But in
2exam ining'the circum stances Surrounding this tem porary setback, 
T aliaferro  can not be held responsible for'the developm ent'ofthe 
conditions, which m om entarily-placed his- troops in  that precarious-
%ee supra. Chapter |H.'
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«situation*' Oh the : whole he -'handled■ his men well* Several ’ of the 
-engagements 'he' participated in were, of-little tactical im portance; 
they w ere  merely-knock-down, -drag*-©Ot fights* Under these conditions 
of close'-,combat and - heavy f ire , T aliaferro  always’ managed fed r  etain 
-order amongst his troops, who perform ed well under fehese difficult 
conditions.
.■-Much: of the Confederate ’strategy Involved m arching, continually 
attem pting to flank* the m ore numerous-’ foe. More often than hot On 
these m ar ches, If w as Taliafer r  o’ s com m and-^fir et his r egiment, 
then his-brigade and finally h is  division**that' was -the'vanguard of 
-the -Confederate Army.-- And if h e  w as not leading, T aliaferro  seemed 
to be guarding the r e a r—contirmally lighting holding and delaying 
rearguard  actions. -Only 'twice during' h is twenty month# id Virginia 
was h is command reported In unsatisfactory condition. -Both tim es, 
organisation had broken down’under adverse circum stances* The 
f irs t incident-occurred following, the two week trek  after G arnett’s 
defeat-at Rich Mountain. The relatively inexperienced tro o p s’had 
undergone a  grueling experience; their commander had been killed 
early  fh th e -re trea t and the new Commanding -officer w a#incapacitated 
by illness* Finally T aliaferro  was-given command* He successfully 
brought the -tattered-forces-to safety. This same force,-- s till not
  ' u im '>■■* * »      m>^ .. WK «'i-,............................................................................................................... .. .................................................................................... .
^Although T aliaferro ’s men escaped, Lfe* Colonel John Fegranfs 
command.of 853 was captured* The other units m ust have had some 100
completely recovered, then underwent the tortuous Romney, campaign 
where disorganisation .and dem oralisation again set in.; 'In both 
instances the troops had faced adverse’ conditions. Hiking many long, 
tedious mUes without proper camp equipment or adequate food, and 
w ith nature not at her'k indest, it  Is eusy to understand why discipline 
became lax. Taliaferro had little  control over these outside forces. 
In both cases / 'as- soon as the adverse; conditions w ere a llev ia ted ,. 
Taliaferro-quickly resto red  his command to-Its-peak .efficiency.
On the whole, T aliaferro  displayed the ability to command.
He ,success fully, managed Jackson’s. division for several m o n th s .. 
Despite his ability, it appeared that Jackson had passed him over 
for promotion*. The reason m ust lie  with the attitude Taliaferro 
displayed dur|ng the en tire  Romney affair.
In January, 1863, while awaiting official word of the new 
prom otions, T aliaferro  became involved In another controversy, 
this time-.with 'Brigadier-G eneral F rank  Paxton. H ostilities between 
the two began over a minor question of m ilitary  etiquette--w hether 
or not court-m artia l proceedings should be forwarded through 
channels and whether the division commander had the right to 
open a sealed packet of court documents. Tem pers flared* The
or m ore wounded and stragglers* T aliaferro’s Tw enty Third only 
lost 32. (See Freem an, Lee’s Lieutenants, I, 23-27, note 36.)
4alleged charges soon reached Army Headquarters* Lee examined
' 5the case; his findings supported T aliaferro 's  position.
The controversy had been decided in T aliaferro 's  favor, but 
the denial of His promotion annoyed him. When he learned that 
T rim ble 's promotion was official, he decided to apply for a ,tran sfe r. 
His m otives seem clear: ‘‘the continual denial of a Major G eneral's 
com mission was an affront to his station as a landed a ris to c ra t and 
a gentleman politician. h7 Oh January 30 he wrote to his commanding 
general asking to be relieved of His command. In urging his transfer 
T aliaferro  said:
1 sincerely tru s t that the Comdg Genl will recognise 
and appreciate the delicacy of sentim ent which influences me 
to urge that he will not in sist that after occupying the position 
of a Division Commander for so long a tim e I will be required  
to assum e a subordinate position in the same division. ®
^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, pp. 443*444; Freem an, L ee 's  
Lieutenants, II, 504*505, citing Paxton, Elisha Franklin Paxton Memoir 
and M emorial, pp. 83*84.
^L etter to Lt, General Jackson from General Lee, January 12, 
1862, T aliaferro  Papers.
^Freem an, L ee 's  L ieutenants, Hi 417.
7fb ld ., 505.
^L etter to B rigadier General R. H. Chilton, H eadquarters, 
Jackson 's Division, from William B. Taliaferro, January 30, 1863, 
Taliaferro  Papers.
T aliaferro 's  request was approved; he was tran sfe rred  to duty in the 
southeastern sta tes. Jackson made no comment about T aliaferro 's  
tra n s fe r—but'his opinion can be inferred by his failure to recommend 
Taliaferro for promotion. So-ended T aliaferro 's  serv ice for the 
Confederacy in Virginia.
In February 1863, T aliaferro  reported to P. G. T. Beauregard 
who assigned him to command the defenses of Savannah and the adjoining 
coast. He was recalled  in July to command Battery Wagner (on M orris 
Island, protecting Charleston, South Carolina). After being bombarded 
heavily for an 'en tire  day--Ju ly  18-*T aliaferro, with le ss  than 1200 men, 
was able to repulse the attack of some 6000 Federals. ? Afterwards he 
was in command of Jam es Island, another defense of Charleston. For 
a  b rief time in 1864 he had a quasi-independent command In Florida, 
but by April he was again in command at Jam es Island. By December 
1864, the Federals under Sherm an's guidance had pushed through 
Georgia to the coast. During the siege of Savannah* T aliaferro  com* 
manded the troops covering its  evacuation. T aliaferro  commanded a 
division of H ardee 's corps In Johnston's arm y during M arch and 
A pril, 1865. In their engagements against the Federals in March,
?Official Records, XXVHI, P art i, 415-421. W illiams, Beau-
regard: Napoleon In Gray, has an excellent description of the en tire  
Federal assault on the Confederate defenses, pp. 209*244.
the Confederates w ere continually pushed northward through North 
Carolina. Finally, oh April 25* the day before Johnston's surrender,
* ATaliaferro was promoted to Major General,
A year ea rlie r, Jam es A. Seddon, then Secretary of War, had 
stated, "of, his ZTTaliaferro's J  gallantry and tried  determ ination on 
the field there can foe no doubt, and his general capacity is, in my 
judgment, fully equal to moat of Our m ajor generals whom I have 
mot,-” H T aliaferro 's  promotion had been delayed at that time for 
several reasons; F irs t, openings w ere oh the whole scarce in the 
southeastern area  where m ilitary  activity was much m ore lim ited 
than in the ba ttle -scarred  Virginia theatre. And when vacancies 
occurred, preference was given to the officers from the immediate 
vicinity; this was just another example of the strong sectionalism  
existing in the South. Another reason involved Seddon himself. He 
was a relative and good friend of T aliaferro 's. This meant using 
extrem e delicacy in pressing  T aliaferro 's promotion le s t charges of 
favoritism  cloud Seddon*£ record.
After the war, Taliaferro returned home w here he continued
Letter to William B. Taliaferro from John C. Breckinridge, 
Secretary  of War, April 25, 1865, T aliaferro  Papers, V irginia 
H istorical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
^O ffic ial Records, XXXV, F art I, 622-623.
to help lead Virginia In her hew life, He realized that the outcome of
the war had changed the Southern way of life . His ideals, though
never surrendered , became pliable, adapting to the new life.
A s a  m em ber of the state leg isla tu re {1874*4879), T aliaferro  opposed
the repudiation of V irginia’s state debt. He believed that Virginia,
and the re s t  of the South, should accept defeat gracefully, and become
an integral part of the new Union. . In 1880 he ran unsuccessfully for
governor of Virginia. The rem ainder of his life centered around h |s
lav /p rac tice , although he continued to be active In public life. He
was Grand M aster of Masons of V irginia from 18?6*to 187?.; He was
a m em ber of the board of v isitor s of several state institutions*
including William and Mary (1870-1897) and V. M. 1. , and also
served as Judge of G loucester County Court from 1891 to 189?. Until
his death, the many distinguished v isito rs to his ancestra l home
Dunham M&ssie saw an old Confederate battleflag draped in the main
14hallway, a tribute to a. lost cause.
^ T a lia fe r ro ’s recollections of the war, Taliaferro  Papers. 
14 Dictionary of A m erican Biography, XVIII, 884.
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